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GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TORTS AND THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE: FEDERALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITYt
JACK M. BEERMANN*

Sovereign and official immunities allow state officials' to inflict tortious
injuries with impunity when similar conduct by private parties would result
in tort liability. Whether the Constitution requires states to compensate their
tort victims lies at the heart of much litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
Several recent cases, in both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts, have addressed the extent to which the federal courts should supert © 1988 by Jack M. Beermann.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Chicago. Thanks to the Boston University
School of Law Summer Research Grant program for supporting this project. I owe a
personal and professional debt to Gary Palm of the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the
University of Chicago who, in long discussions about Parrattv. Taylor, and Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., sparked my interest in civil rights law. Thanks to Joe Singer,
Ron Cass, Ira C. Lupu, Larry Sager, Ken Simons, Avi Soifer, Larry Yackle, Richard
Epstein, Wendy Parmet, and Mark Brown for reading drafts and providing helpful
comments. I also benefited from the comments on and questions about a draft of this
article presented at the Boston University Law School faculty workshop. Thanks
also to David Addis and Lauren Liss for research assistance.
' For the purposes of this article, the words "state" or "state official" encompass
all branches of state and local government and officials of those bodies whose
activities would constitute state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. I only briefly address special issues concerning whether local governments and
officials are amenable to suit, or contrasting the differences in amenability to suit
between states and their officials, and local governments and their officials. The
eleventh amendment bars suits directly against states. Local governments, however,
may be sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and have no immunity from
such suits. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (rejecting lower
court's award of qualified or good faith immunity to a municipality sued under § 1983
for a fourteenth amendment liberty deprivation). This article attempts to find a
substantive basis in federal constitutional law for a § 1983 suit against the state or a
state official for conduct that is tortious under state law.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) [hereinafter § 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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vise state policy concerning such immunities. 3 This complex issue has impli-

cations far beyond the rather mundane or even absurd situations that often
give rise to the cases. 4 The federal courts have failed to solve the constitutional problems underlying these cases because they have not addressed
directly the constitutionality of the immunities.5 Instead, the courts have
implicitly sanctioned the use of such immunities by denying remedies to
plaintiffs on other grounds.
In recent years, federal courts have become increasingly reluctant to grant
remedies to plaintiffs in official tort suits. 6 This has been motivated by
See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986).
4 The most famous case in this line, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), arose
when a prison employee negligently lost a prisoner's hobby kit worth $23.50. Many of
the cases involve small losses of property or minor contractual disputes and thus do
not look like the paradigm civil rights case over which the federal courts should have
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff
claiming deprivation of property interest in accrued vacation tirae for county sheriff's
police). But these mundane or absurd fact patterns should not belittle the importance
of the issues being addressed, for they all concern the general issue of how states
should treat victims of officially inflicted torts, an issue that deserves federal court
attention. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
, See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333 n.l ("[W]e need not decide whether ...

the

possibility of a sovereign immunity defense in a Virginia tort suit would render that
remedy 'inadequate' ....
); id. at 336 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments in
Daniels and Davidson) (defense of sovereign immunity does not render state procedure unfair); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (holding that state grant of
absolute immunity to parole officers for torts arising out of parole decisions does not
violate due process); Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 830 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(finding that state remedy is adequate despite defense of sovereign immunity), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
6 This growing reluctance by federal courts to provide remedies to victims of
official torts can be seen in the courts' growing reliance on principles of federalism to
reduce the scope of federal court jurisdiction. For instance, in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Court refused to assume jurisdiction over plaintiff's
claim that an officer's improper stranglehold on the plaintiff deprived him of his
liberty interest in protection from bodily harm. The Court reasoned that, among other
things, plaintiff failed to establish the irreparable injury necessary to give the federal
courts power to issue an injunction against the state. Id. at 101-13. Three years later,
in Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327, the Court refused to hear the plaintiff's claim that the
state deprived him of the same liberty interest on the grounds that the fourteenth
amendment did not contemplate protection from the negligence of state officials.
Breach of contract cases against local government agencies do not seem to be
suffering a similar fate in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd.
of Educ., 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that public school employees have a property
interest in continued employment sufficient to trigger due process safeguards). But
see, e.g., Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 363-65 (7th Cir. 1983) (doubting whether
accrued vacation time constituted a constitutionally protected property interest). In
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contemporary conservative federalism ideology, which embraces a fundamental revulsion against federal control over state official conduct. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the federal Constitution should be read to
curb only abuses of state power, not the everyday torts of state officials, and
that state law on official torts should not be turned into a federal body of
law. 7 State sovereignty8 is threatened, the argument continues, if federal
courts employ federal law to force states to compensate their tort victims.
The Court, however, has encountered tremendous difficulty not only in
constructing a theoretical justification for keeping tort cases against state
officials out of the federal courts, 9 but also in distinguishing factually between cases that belong in the federal courts and those that do not. 10

this article I specifically address tort claims against local governments and their
officials. Similar analysis applies to contract claims.
I Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (refusing to turn the fourteenth amendment into a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
be administered by the states"). The image in Paul of the fourteenth amendment
turning into a font of tort law has appeared in a number of subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
8 In this article, the terms "sovereign" and "sovereignty" are used in a very weak
sense, referring only to authority that the state purports, attempts, or desires to
possess. Sovereign immunity means the immunity that the state enjoys because it is a
state not because it is in some absolute sense a sovereign. Because the Constitution's
supremacy clause subjects states to federal law, states are not "sovereign" in any
absolute sense; however, in our federal system, state authority within protected
spheres is thought of as a vestige of prefederal or nonfederal sovereignty. See
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism after
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 346-59. Rapaczynski persuasively argues that
federalism discourse would be enhanced if the rhetoric of state sovereignty were
abandoned because "the array of traditional meanings" of sovereignty simply do not
apply to states in the American federal system. ld. at 346. His discussion goes far
toward explaining the relationship between the states and federal government both in
terms of contemporary distribution of power and the constitutional structure.
9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari three times on the issue of whether
negligence could give rise to a civil rights cause of action under § 1983. See Parratt,
451 U.S. at 532 (noting that in each of the two-earlier cases, Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978), and Baker v. McCollam, 443 U.S. 137 (1974), the Court had
found it unnecessary to decide whether negligence gave rise to a § 1983 action). It
finally answered this question affirmatively in Parratt;but later, the Court overruled,
or at least avoided, its conclusion in Parratt, holding that even if negligence can
violate § 1983, the negligent deprivation of property or liberty was not a deprivation
under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at
332-33.
10 The Supreme Court itself has difficulty deciding whether a given set of facts
should give rise to a federal claim against state officials. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983) (holding that federal court may award punitive damages for prison
guard's failure to protect state prison inmate from hostile fellow inmate) with David-
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The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the connection between its
official tort cases and state sovereign immunity." Only Justices O'Connor
and Stevens, in separate opinions, have discussed how federal civil rights
jurisdiction in tort cases interacts with the immunity of the states and state
officials. 2 Justice O'Connor believes that in some circumstances a state's
refusal to provide a remedy for a state-inflicted tort may create a federal
constitutional claim, but only perhaps after the victim has first sought redress in the state courts and been refused. 13 Justice Stevens, on the other
hand, argues that state sovereign immunity is largely constitutional, unless it
protects "conduct that violates a federal constitutional guarantee."' 4
Numerous moral, political, and social issues inform the question whether

son v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (holding that essentially same facts did not give
rise to federal claim).
11The term "sovereign immunity" is intended in this article as shorthand for
states' authority to set the rules governing the tort liability of itself and its officials.
Through constitutions, statutes, and common law, states employ doctrines such as
sovereign immunity and official immunity to limit the liability of themselves and their
officials.
The academic literature concerning Parratthas, to some extent, recognized that
the constitutionality of immunities is at stake in the cases. For discussions of the
connection between federal constitutional tort litigation and state sovereignty in this
sense, see Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 996 & n. 109 (1986); Smolla, The Displacement
of FederalDue Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L.

REV.

831, 875-77; Wells & Eaton,

Substantive Due Process and the Scope of ConstitutionalTorts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201,
209, 221 (1984); see also P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 47-51 (1983). For discussions of the connection between suits

against government officials and sovereign immunity generally, see Byse, Proposed
Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962); Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); Note,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV.

L.

REV. !060 (1946).
11See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 336-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
13 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 540 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 342-43 (Stevens, J., concurring). Read
out of context, this
statement seems tautological: sovereign immunity is constitutional unless it is not
constitutional. What Justice Stevens means, I think, is that state-created sovereign
immunity itself does not violate the Constitution; but if a specific constitutional
provision, such as the fourth amendment, is violated, sovereign immunity cannot
prevent a remedy. The distinction between general due process violations and violations of other constitutional provisions has been important to the development of
federal supervision of state tortious conduct. See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
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the states, or state officials, should compensate victims of state inflicted
torts. In this article, I address only the special problem of federally compelled compensation for parties injured by state government. I will assume
that there is general agreement on the desirability of compensation in tort. 15
Special problems arise, however, if federal law requires compensation
against state wishes. If state political systems are working well,' 6 and the

15

Such agreement might not extend to compensation for government-inflicted

torts. The issues concerning compensation for government-inflicted injuries are often
the same as in private tort situations. Arguments that liability makes government
functions too expensive to perform, and results in overdeterrence, resemble arguments that tort liability makes the provision of goods and services in the private
sector too risky. But government liability also presents special problems, because
government may perform functions that are too risky and too important for the
private sector; the cost of overdeterrence, therefore, may be higher. Note, Local
Government Sovereign Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
43, 54-56 (1982). Some arguments for government liability depend on the special
nature of government, such as the value of government accountability, the great
potential for harm by government, the moral view that government should set an
example by strict adherence to legal norms, and the superior ability of government to
spread losses. See Note, A Theory of Negligencefor Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE

L.J. 683, 697-98 (1983) (arguing that the risk of harm by government is greater than
from private entities because of government's right to use coercive power); see
generally P. SCHUCK, supra note 11. The long history of state and official immunity
stands against these arguments, but recent literature questions its pedigree in the
United States. For a list of arguments for and against sovereign and official immunity,
see Spader, Immunity v. Liability and the Clash of Fundamental Values: Ancient
Mysteries Crying Out for Understanding, 61 CHI. KENT L. REV. 61, 70-71 (1986).

Numerous scholars agree that the American common law of sovereign immunity
mistakenly assumed that government in England did not routinely pay damages for
injuries it caused to subjects. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 11, at 1-19 (tracing the
history of English sovereign immunity law and concluding that the doctrine was
vague, without determinative impact, and largely used as a procedural bar); Note,
supra note 11, at 1060 n.2. (citing sources supporting the contention that the concept
on which sovereign immunity is based, that "the king can do no wrong," is inapplicable to the United States, and its development in England was based on a misconception of early law and practice).
16 The assumption here is a big one. Victims of state torts are unlikely to be part of
a group that could easily organize itself politically and, although it is sometimes
asserted, it is by no means clear that state government is very responsive to individual interests. Mark Tushnet has argued that the growth of local government and an
evolving political system that allows national political figures to bypass local offices
altogether has made local government less accessible and responsive than adherents
of contemporary federalism claim. Tushnet, Federalismand the Traditionsof American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 991-93 (1985).

Nevertheless, Rapaczynski has argued, in an excellent description of post-Garcia
federalism, that the presence of separate local and national spheres of authority
opens the political system to a wider variety of group interests. Rapaczynski, supra
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political community has decided that victims of state torts should not receive
compensation, then federal intervention might frustrate the political community's chosen course and have consequences
beyond the mere payment
17
of money from the local treasury.
Professor Schuck has persuasively argued that government liability be
expanded by allowing vicarious liability under § 1983 and eliminating the
eleventh amendment defense.1 8 Official tort plaintiffs have usually sought
compensation under the due process clause, but current due process clause
interpretations have made recovery against government by private parties
more difficult. 19 Another doctrinal basis for such recovery must be found to
ensure that plaintiffs can be compensated by the state for abuses of state
power.

note 8, at 395. He argues that distribution of governmental authority to units in the
federal system protects against tyranny by protecting geographically defined
minorities, facilitating group organization, and shielding against national government
attack on individual liberties. Id. Rapaczynski's analysis, however, neglects the
changed perspective on protection of individual liberties that emerged after the Civil
War. One important lesson garnered from the post-Civil War amendments and civil
rights legislation is that active federal involvement is necessary to protect federal
rights against abuses of state power. Federalism discourse suffers from its inability to
reconcile the pre-Civil War fear of the national government with the post-War federal
attack on state government oppression. Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) with Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
17 The electorate might, for a variety of reasons, choose a system in which the
state is not required to compensate tort victims. Jaffe argues that requiring government to pay when it damages property does not threaten government functions so
long as government retains the power of eminent domain. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 24.
In his pathbreaking article on just compensation, Professor Michelman argues that
stringent compensation requirements may sometimes do more harm than good and
that the community will not demand compensation if the gains from a system of
noncompensation outweigh the losses from uncompensated takings. Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1222 (1967).
8 See P. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 118-21 (arguing that liability should be placed

on entities and not individuals, and recommending changes to the Federal Tort
Claims Act and to the Supreme Court's application of § 1983 regarding state and local
liability). The Court has interpreted § 1983 to not allow liability for government
entities under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). The Court has also held that the
eleventh amendment bars state liability for damages in § 1983 cases unless the state
consents to suit. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
'9 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that negligence by
state officials did not constitute a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment).
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Justice O'Connor has identified the takings clause of the fifth amendment
20
as a possible constitutional basis for compensating victims of state torts.
The takings clause could be read to require states to compensate their tort

victims. However, the Court's reservations, as developed in the due process
cases, must first be overcome. For example, a state's refusal to compensate
tort victims must be considered a taking of property within the meaning of
the takings clause. The Court might decide to read the fifth amendment's
prohibition against uncompensated takings-as it has the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause-not to address the accidental destruction
of property.21 Refusal to compensate tort victims must be considered an
abuse of state power. Finally, it must be established that forcing states to

compensate their tort victims will not inevitably lead to a federal body of
official tort law.
In this article, I argue that state sovereign and official immunities, insofar
as they bar recovery when private parties would be liable for similar conduct, are unconstitutional under the takings clause of the fifth amendment,
as applied to the states under the fourteenth.12 A state's refusal to compensate plaintiffs for the tortious damage or destruction of property should be
redressed by the federal courts in civil actions brought under § 1983.
Section I of this article provides background through a discussion of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the problem of torts committed by government officials, primarily in procedural due process cases. This section illustrates that procedural due process analysis is a dead end, incapable of

The takings clause provides: -[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Justice O'Connor's
theory of using the takings clause as a basis for recovery on official tort claims was
proposed in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her concurring opinion could be read to argue that an uncompensated government tort constitutes a violation of the takings clause.
21 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. at 332-33 (holding that property loss occasioned by state official negligence is not a deprivation under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment). Likewise, although the takings clause has not been
confined to proper eminent domain proceedings, it might not be extended to cover
negligent property loss. Such loss may not constitute a taking for a "public use." See
20

Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power, and the Fifth Amendment: Defining
the Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (1986) (arguing against

recent expansions of takings analysis beyond eminent domain context). Professor
Epstein, on the other hand, argues that government torts should be subject to the
requirements of the takings clause and governments should also be required to
compensate for any conduct that would be considered tortious between private
parties. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 37-39 (1985).
22 See First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987).
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solving the problem of whether the federal courts (and federal law) should
defer to state immunity decisions. Section II demonstrates how the takings
clause can be interpreted to require states to compensate tort victims
whenever similar conduct would give rise to liability between private parties. Under this theory, sovereign and official immunities would be unconstitutional to the extent they prevented state tort victims from receiving
compensation. Section III addresses implementation concerns that comprise
the technical body of federalism doctrine-that is, whether legal rules that
limit access to federal courts should bar enforcement of the takings clause in
federal court. I conclude that deference to state prerogatives requires at
most that the state courts be allowed the initial opportunity to provide a
remedy, but that ultimately the federal courts should be allowed to use the
takings clause to overrule the state courts' refusal to provide compensation
to victims of state-inflicted torts.
I.

STATE TORTS AND FEDERAL DEFERENCE

The § 1983 action is the primary vehicle by which state tort victims have
attempted to vindicate federal rights against state officials.2 3 In § 1983 cases,
the tort victim usually alleges that his or her property or liberty was taken by
the tortious conduct of state officials without due process of law.2 4 Typically,
the due process allegation directs the court's focus to the procedures surrounding the deprivation. 25 Herein lies the problem: most plaintiffs are not
really complaining about the lack of procedural safeguards; rather, they are
complaining about the absence of compensation for a loss that has been
inflicted tortiously by a state official.2 6
Plaintiffs have not succeeded in shifting the courts' attention away from
the procedural aspects of their claims. Some plaintiffs have explicitly dis-

23 P. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 119. For an illuminating study of the workings of
§ 1983 actions in federal court, see Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987) (providing an empirical study
of constitutional tort litigation in federal court, and concluding that the image of the
civil rights litigation explosion is exaggerated).
24 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). By tortious conduct, I mean conduct
that does not arguably violate any constitutional provision other than the due process
or takings clauses. Thus, I am not including cases like Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), in which the defendants violated the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights.
25 See, e.g., Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543 (applying balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine whether post-deprivation remedy for loss
of property satisfied due process).
26 See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (noting that although
plaintiff described "his claim as one of 'procedural due process, pure and simple,' "
what he really wanted was compensation for the loss he suffered) (citation omitted).
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claimed reliance on the procedural aspects of the due process clause, and
have argued that tortious conduct by state officials violated substantive due
process in that the official conduct is unreasonable and does not advance a
legitimate state interest. Such a substantive claim would allow the federal
court to focus on the constitutionality of the refusal to compensate instead of
on the procedural issue. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to
consider whether tortious conduct by state officials can violate substantive
due process if it does not violate any other consitutional provision. 27 Subsequently, a federal court has interpreted this refusal to mean that substantive
analysis is "inapplicable" to some undefined category of liberty and prop28
erty deprivations.

Courts addressing due process claims under § 1983 have not directly
addressed the propriety of state government treatment of its tort victims and
the appropriate federal response. Rather, the cases have turned on apparently technical applications of the due process clause. 29 In § 1983 cases
alleging constitutional violations other than denial of due process, however,
the courts have confronted more directly the propriety of the challenged
conduct and the appropriate federal response.3 0 These cases are united by an
undercurrent of concern over the appropriate federal response to state
conduct that causes injury to private parties.
Since the birth of the modern civil rights action in Monroe v. Pape,3 1 the

See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (holding prisoner's substantive
due process rights to be coterminus with his eighth amendment rights); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (granting certiorari on procedural due process issues but
not substantive due process claim).
28 In Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1984), Judge Flaum, in his
concurring opinion, did not analyze whether a state breach of contract violated
substantive due process even though the plaintiffs raised a substantive due process
claim. He reasoned that because the Supreme Court had addressed only procedural
claims in Parrattand Logan, "substantive due process is inapplicable here." Id. The
majority ruled against the substantive due process claim by denying that bare property deprivations, without an additional constitutional violation such as a first
amendment or fourth amendment violation, can create substantive due process
violations. Id. at 367. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether tortious
conduct by state officials can violate substantive due process.
29 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that negligent
infliction of injury is not a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process
clause); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that postdeprivation remedy
satisfies due process in cases of random and unauthorized deprivations).
30 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1(1985) (holding use of excessive force
by police in arresting a burglary suspect violated fourth amendment); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that petitioners subjected to an illegal break-in and
strip-search by state police had made out a successful § 1983 action alleging violations of their fourth amendment rights).
3- 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Two propositions originating with Monroe seem clear:
27

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 277

federal courts have struggled to create a boundary between state and federal
power over tortious conduct by state officials.3 2 Although the conflict between federal constitutional norms and state autonomy has been largely
solved for cases raising claims other than procedural due process, the due
process cases are still in search of a coherent theoretical foundation.
Traditionally, states have possessed the authority to decide matters of
substantive tort law and immunity. 33 Consequently, state autonomy is
threatened in two distinct ways by federal court § 1983 suits against state
governmental units and officials. First, federal norms might subsume state
tort law, in effect setting federal standards and rules concerning duty of care,

federal law grants a cause of action in federal court against state officials for violations of at least those constitutional rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and the
existence of state remedies is irrelevant to these causes of action. Id. at 183. If there
is also a remedy in state court, the litigant is free to choose between the state and
federal remedies.
A point about terminology is in order here. In the literature, a distinction has been
made between "substantive" constitutional rights-basically any constitutional right
except due process-and the right to due process. Consequently, scholars and judges
have argued that Monroe stands for the proposition that the victim of a "substantive" constitutional right violation may bring immediately to federal court a § 1983
action, while a due process claimant may first need to prove that state remedies are
inadequate. I resist using such terminology because the rhetorical relegation of due
process to a second-class status obscures the question whether due process should be
treated differently than other constitutional rights.
32 One example of this struggle is the difficulty the federal courts have had in
shaping the contours of municipal liability. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs.
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that a municipality can be held
liable under § 1983 if it is found to have unconstitutuional policies or customs. Since
Monell, though, the federal courts have struggled to determine what constitutes a
municipal policy or custom. The Court itself is split on the issue. See City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915, 922-28 (1988) (plurality opinion) (arguing for new,
more restrictive standard for municipal liability); id. at 928-36 (opinion concurring in
the judgment) (finding no municipal liability under current standard); id. at 936
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding municipal liability under current standard).
33 Nothing in the Constitution specifically allocates to state government power
over tort law and immunity. Also, I do not mean to claim that traditional state
functions are shielded from federal intervention. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (abandoning the "traditional" and "nontraditional
government function" distinction in the commerce clause context). Rather,
federalism should be viewed in a functional manner, with states assuming those
functions that they can best serve. See Rapaczynski, supra note 8, at 357. It is no
more than a hunch, perhaps a generally shared one, that leads me to believe that, in
most situations, allocations to the states of authority over tort policy is appropriate.
The inability to carve out definite spheres of state autonomy has been a recognized
failure of federalist rhetoric. Id. at 344.
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causation, and the like. Second, federal intervention may threaten to undermine the policy choices underlying state tort law, especially in the area of
34
immunizing government units and officials from suit.
Concern for state autonomy over decisions regarding tortious conduct by
state officials militates against a policy of allowing victims of constitutional
torts to sue the state or state officials in federal court. In Monroe, the
defendant argued that because a remedy was available in state court under
state law, the plaintiff should use the state remedies. 35 In his dissent in
Monroe, Justice Frankfurter, recognizing that more than forum selection
was at stake, rejected the majority's decision to allow the federal action
despite the availability of the state remedy. 36 He observed that state law, not
37
federal law, creates whatever tort law rights exist for redress of injuries.
He then reasoned that, as long as the states provide a mechanism to vindicate rights created by their law, federal jurisdiction should not exist. Justice
Frankfurter was motivated by the concern that federal court decisions would
conflict with state policy. 38 He argued that the federal courts should intervene only if the Illinois state courts had refused relief to the petitioners
because "the official character of the respondents clothed them with civil
39
immunity."
Justice Frankfurter's concern for state authority over official tort policy
captures the essence of the federalism arguments against expansive federal
civil rights jurisdiction. He recognized, however, that to maintain the
supremacy of federal law and the federal Constitution under the supremacy
clause, 40 the state courts, and state law, should not have the final say on
whether a state official had violated federal constitutional norms. The tension in Frankfurter's argument is apparent: he would not leave the states free
from federal supervision; rather, he would just delay the day of reckoning. If
a federal court, applying federal law, overrules a state's decision against

34 While it is important to assume, for the purposes of this federalism discussion,
that state tort law reflects conscious policy choices, it is more realistic to recognize
that state common law is often merely an aggregation of conflicting policy preferences established by various tribunals at various times. At least since Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts have treated these loosely aggregated
decisions of state courts as authoritative pronouncements of state policy.
35 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
36 Justice Frankfurter dissented from the Court's holding that § 1983 reaches
conduct that violates state law as well as federal law. Id. at 202-59 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting in part).
37 Id. at 245 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
38 !d. at 242-43 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
39 Id. at 211 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
40 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]" U.S. CONsT. art.
VI, cl.2.
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liability, the state's freedom to set standards of conduct through its tort law
necessarily will be compromised.
It is easy to understand why state autonomy over official tort policy
should yield to federal law when there is a violation of a constitutional right
such as the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. In such cases, the supremacy of federal law over state
law is at stake. Because the federal constitutional provision is specific and
limited, relative to the vague and general words of the due process clause,
the potential for displacement of state authority is not so great. Striking a
balance in the due process area between federal supremacy and state authority has been difficult because all state tort victims can allege colorable due
process claims, since their property or person has been damaged or injured
41
at the hands of a state official without notice or a prior hearing.
The Court repeatedly has held that every common law tort committed by a
state official does not create a due process-based § 1983 suit. The Court fears
both that federal law would subsume state tort law and that the federal
courts would be flooded with what the Court views as ordinary tort cases
against state officials. 42 No solid doctrinal basis exists, however, for keeping
state official tort cases out of the federal courts. The failure of different
Supreme Court attempts to create a doctrinal basis illustrates the problem.
In Paul v. Davis ,'43
the Court held that defamation of an individual by a
government official did not deprive the individual of liberty or property
under the fourteenth amendment. 44 The Court's holding in Paul was motivated primarily by the fear that "such a reading would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States." ' 45 The Court's apparent
See Whitman, Government Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 85 MIcH. L.
REV. 225, 266 (1986).
41

42 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (warning that the
fourteenth amendment should not become a "font of tort law"); Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (same); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (same).
There is a widely shared perception that federal courts are flooded with § 1983
cases and, implicitly, that the increase in § 1983 litigation has been greater 'than
increases in federal litigation generally. This perception may not be accurate. According to Eisenberg and Schwab's study of constitutional torts in the federal system,
the amount of litigation under § 1983 has not increased more than the amount of
federal litigation generally. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 23, at 693-95.
43 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
44 The plaintiff in Paul was a victim of a local police effort to control shoplifting.
The local police produced and distributed to area merchants a list, with photographs,
of "active shoplifters." Davis, who had been charged of shoplifting, was on this list.
He alleged that the defamation violated due process because the defamation had
deprived him of his liberty interest in his reputation without a predeprivation hearing.
Id. at 694-96.
45 Id. at 701.
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concern in Paul, then, is that federal standards would subsume state tort law
if the Court were to find a § 1983 violation for defamation actions against
state officials.
Doctrinally, Paul is incoherent because it provides no basis for determining whether a liberty or property interest has been affected by state official
conduct. The Court in Paul did acknowledge that many "liberty" and
"property" interests are first created by state law and then protected by
the
procedural guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, 46 but it then held that
conduct which abridges an interest protected under state law does not
necessarily deprive a person of liberty or property in a constitutional sense
just because the tortfeasor is a state official. According to the Court, any
interest affected is "simply one of a number which the State may protect
against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of
those interests by means of damages actions." 47 The Court does not explain
which rights recognized by state tort law are sufficient to create liberty or
property interests and which are not. State tort law creates property rights
through causes of action such as trespass and conversion. It should not
matter, for purposes of determining whether a constitutionally protected
interest exists, what remedy the state extends. 4 Following the Court's
Id. at 708-11; accord Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
4 Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.
48 A majority of the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that
procedural law limits the substance of a property right. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (" 'Property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty."); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (1974) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and concurring in result in part) (recognizing that substantive law, and not
procedure, shapes the contours of a property interest under the fourteenth amendment); id. at 177-78, 185 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same);
id. at 211 (Marshall, J.,joined by Brennan and Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (same). Thus,
if state law creates a legitimate expectation of continued enjoyment of a property
right, as a matter of federal constitutional law it makes no difference that the state
provides no remedy if the interest is damaged. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 431-33 (1982) (holding that statutory limitation of 120 days within which
to hold a hearing is a procedural limitation which does not affect plaintiff's substantive claims). This dichotomy between procedure and substance reduces state
sovereignty over tort policy because it exposes state procedural regulations to federal
due process scrutiny. State substantive law, however, is not subjected to this
scrutiny: if a state does not create a cause of action as a remedy for certain
deprivations, there is no property interest for fourteenth amendment purposes.
This dichotomy has its appeal as a matter of common sense. People expect to be
compensated when their property is damaged. These expectations probably do not
arise from an understanding of procedural bars and immunity defenses, which may
prevent plaintiffs injured by tortious action by a state official from receiving compensation or even a reasonable opportunity to seek redress. Whether federal due process
will allow a state immunity to defeat claims against the state altogether remains
46
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reasoning in Paul, state common law would be insufficient to create a
property interest, but the Court expressly denies this reasoning elsewhere in
the opinion.4 9
Finding state common law insufficient to create a property interest also
contradicts the Court's holding in Board of Regents v. Roth.50 Paul neither

recognizes that state tort law creates federally protected property rights nor
appreciates the distinction between substance and procedure developed in
the line of cases beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 51 and including Goss v.
Lopez. 2 In those cases, the Court held that property and liberty interests are
created by state substantive law: if state substantive law creates an expectation that an interest is protected, the interest is protected by the due process
clause.5 That the state law in Paul protected the plaintiff's reputation
through a defamation action should have been enough to create a property or
liberty interest. The action of the defendants, as local officials, constituted
state action and action under color of law, thereby satisfying the requirements of the fourteenth amendment and § 1983. The only remaining question
would be whether the state tort action satisfied due process.5 This is preunsettled. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n.5 (1980) (suggesting that
state immunity could be considered part of the definition of the property interest).
'9 It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which
are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning
of either "liberty" or "property" as meant in the Due Process Clause. These
interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been
initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled
that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever
the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 709-10
(recognizing that defamation which results in the termination of employment or
expulsion from public school affects a property right under the fifth and fourteenth amendments).
" Property interests ...

are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are

created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (noting that state common law of implied contract may create
protected property interest).
51 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
52

419 U.S. 565 (1975).

13 See id. at 572-76 (holding that public high school student has a constitutionally
recognized property interest in his public education); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (holding
that state law provides the source of constitutionally protected property interests).
4 See Paul, 424 U.S. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The only issue properly
presented by this case is whether petitioners' intentional conduct infringed any of
respondent's 'liberty' or 'property' interests without due process of law, and that is
the question to be addressed.").
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5
cisely the tack the Court took in Parrattv. Taylor.
The failure of Paul to provide a coherent basis for rejecting state tort
claims, as well as the Court's focus on the technicalities of due process,
forced the Court to look elsewhere to keep state tort claims out of federal
court. The Court next attempted to construct a coherent doctrine to keep
state tort cases out of federal court by reasoning that due process might be
satisfied by postdeprivation state remedies. According to the Court, the due
process clause does not require that procedures precede the deprivation:
process rights of their
states might, in some circumstances, satisfy the due
56
fact.
the
after
remedy
a
providing
by
tort victims
Several reasons can be advanced for encouraging reliance on postdeprivation state remedies before allowing a federal § 1983 suit in some state tort
cases. First, allowing an immediate federal court suit presumably would
cause a flood of litigation in the federal courts, especially if the tortious
activity is not amenable to a predeprivation hearing. 57 Second, the federal
court, in determining whether a protected interest has been damaged, might
be forced to decide issues of state tort or property law.5 8 Finally, the federal
courts might substitute their judgment for that of the state courts, thereby
reducing state autonomy over tort law. For example, in Ingraham v.
Wright 5 9 the Court held that the due process clause did not require a

It is not surprising that Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Paul
conflicts with the distinction made in the Goldberg line of cases between substantive
and procedural law; he does not agree with that distinction:
Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural mechanism
for enforcing the substantive right which was simultaneously conferred, we
decline to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from
the procedure provided for its enforcement.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., announcing the judgment
of the Court).
55 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981) ("Our inquiry therefore must focus on whether the
respondent has suffered a deprivation of property without due process of law.").
56 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-82 (1977) (finding that traditional postdeprivation common law remedies afforded due process in cases involving
corporal punishment in public schools); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(holding that due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the
termination of social security disability benefits). The Court reaffirmed these holdings
in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981) (holding that postdeprivation procedure afforded by Nebraska tort claims procedure provided due process to prisoner
deprived of his hobby kit).
57 This view was expressed by Justice Scalia in one of his first speeches as a
Supreme Court Justice. See Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of U.S. Courts, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1 at 1, col. 1.
5 While the Court did not articulate its reasoning this way, it seems that where
state tort law does not condemn the particular injury-producing conduct, then no
federally protected interest has been damaged.
59 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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prepunishment hearing for school children who were subjected to corporal
punishment. 6 Because state tort law regulated corporal punishment, the
Court held that the postpunishment state tort remedy for unreasonable
punishment provided all the process that was due. 61 The Court thought that
forcing students to bring claims in state court under state tort law was the
best way to allow the state to decide the propriety of corporal punishment.
This way, state law decides which interests are to be protected from government invasion.
Paul and Ingraham resulted in the following paradox. Recall Justice
Frankfurter's call in Monroe for exhaustion of state remedies before a
federal § 1983 suit may be brought. 62 An exhaustion requirement could work
with non-due process claims, because whatever the decision in the state
court, the underlying constitutional violation will still have occurred. With
due process cases, however, a state decision against the plaintiffs might
indicate that no protected interest was damaged. For example, in Brown v.
3
Brienen,*
the plaintiffs, county sheriff's police, sued because they were not
allowed to take their accrued vacations at the time the county had promised.
They alleged that they had a property interest in the accrued vacations and
that the property was taken without due process. The Seventh Circuit held
that state contract remedies provided all the process that was due. 64 The
court doubted that the claimed deprivation was final because the plaintiffs
had not sued in state court for damages or for an order allowing them to take
their accrued time off.65 The court's observation is paradoxical: state law
creates the entitlement, yet the federal court will provide relief for the
deprivation of that entitlement only if the state court denies relief, presumably on some state law grounds. If state law provides no relief, however,
perhaps there is no entitlement in the first place.
In an attempt to sort out the procedural due process mess left by Paul and
Ingraham, the Court developed a theory to identify cases in which state
postdeprivation remedies alone satisfied due process. Undoubtedly, there

60 Id. at 678-82. The Court denied certiorari on the question whether the corporal
punishment violated substantive due process. Id. at 659 n. 12; see Wells & Eaton,
supra note 11, at 216 (arguing that the Court's decision in Ingraham should be
understood only in procedural terms, and not as a substantive constitutional limitation on the right to be protected from corporal punishment).
61 430 U.S. at 672.
62 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
63 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983).
6 The court doubted that a state contractual right to the vacations was property
within the due process clause, but it rested its decision on the adequacy of state
contract remedies. Id. at 365. The court also observed that contract disputes between
local government and employees have "nothing to do with civil rights as ordinarily
understood." Id. at 362-63.
65

Id. at 366.
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are some instances in which predeprivation process is required by the due
process clause, 66 yet Ingraham and Paul do not help identify them. In
Parrattv. Taylor,6 7 Hudson v. Palmer,' and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co. ,69 the Court attempted to construct a theory for determining when due
process required a predeprivation hearing and when a postdeprivation hearing would suffice.
Parratt arose from the negligent loss of a prisoner's hobby kit by state
prison employees. The Court held that the negligent destruction of the
property was a deprivation of that property within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. But the Court also noted that it would be fanciful to
expect the state to provide predeprivation process when the deprivation
arose from the negligence of a state official.7 0 Consequently, the Court
shifted its focus to whether the state's postdeprivation remedies satisfied the
requirements of due process.7 1 In Logan, the Court attempted to clarify

See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1985)
(holding that a pretermination hearing is required where a public employee can be
fired only for cause).
67 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
66

68

468 U.S. 517 (1984).

455 U.S. 422 (1982).
U.S. at 537-41 (holding that due process guarantees nothing more
than that a state cannot deprive a person of liberty or property without providing a
meaningful opportunity for the victim of the deprivation to be heard).
71 Id. at 541-44. Under the due process analysis established in Parratt, adequate
postdeprivation remedies satisfy due process in cases of "random and unauthorized"
deprivations. The characterization "random and unauthorized" attaches to deprivations that, according to the Court, cannot be preceded by a predeprivation hearing
because the state cannot anticipate the occurrence in time to hold a hearing. Thus,
the Court considered the negligent loss of property in Parratt as random and unauthorized. Id. at 540-45. Similarly, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the
intentional destruction of a prisoner's property by a prison guard was considered
random and unauthorized because the Court felt that the state should not have to
anticipate the intentional torts of low level officials. Under the Parratt-Hudson
analysis, due process requires states to convene predeprivation hearings only in
cases where the state itself is implicated. Subsequently, the Court has held that when
a deprivation of property occurs through operation of the state system itself, the state
must hold a predeprivation hearing. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982). How these distinctions operate is not self-evident.
Another argument in favor of a predeprivation hearing arises when a high level
official commits the tort. It might be expected that a prison guard would not hold a
hearing before maliciously destroying an inmate's property. But a warden's torts
could be considered torts committed directly by the state, because the warden is a
party within the system who would be expected to convene a hearing when required.
It may be practicable for a warden to hold a hearing before committing a tort. This
analysis is analogous to the standard some courts have used to determine whether an
official's conduct should be considered municipal policy for the purposes of imposing
69

70 Parratt,451
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Parratt by confining Parratt'srule to random and unauthorized deprivations. According to the Court, if state policy required the destruction of the
72
property then the due process clause required a predeprivation hearing.
But Hudson extended the Parrattholding to cover intentional deprivations
73
resulting from the random and unauthorized conduct of state officials.
Facially, the Parratt-Hudsondoctrine defers to state authority over tort
policy because it directs official tort cases to the state courts. The tone of the
Parrattopinion, and its references to Ingraham and Paul, also indicate that
the Court sought a rule that would increase state autonomy in these matters. 74 But the Court could not simply banish to state courts all due process
cases, for due process guarantees that some procedure must be available to
redress harm to protected interests. If, for example, the state provided no
procedure for redress of constitutional deprivations, then due process would
mandate that federal courts provide one. Likewise, if the state's postdeprivation remedy is inadequate, then the holding in Parrattmandates that the
plaintiff's constitutional claim is redressable in federal court in a § 1983 suit.
The issue of state authority over official tort policy is thus shifted to defining
"adequate state remedy."
If one interprets Parrattto require an adequate state remedy which cannot
be defeated with an immunity defense, then state authority over official tort
policy is threatened: if the state decides not to provide a remedy, the federal
court, under the due process clause, will. 75 This interpretation of Parratt
would effectively overrule state immunities to the extent that the immtnities
76
barred any opportunity to receive compensation for the tortious injury.

§ 1983 liability. See supra note 32. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the analogy
between the standard for municipal liability and the predeprivation hearing requirement standard in Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1456 n.5 (1 th Cir.
1985).
72 Logan, 455 U.S. at 435-36.
73 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Hudson arose from an illegal shakedown search, in which
prison officials found a ripped pillow in Palmer's trash can, and subsequently brought
proceedings against him for destroying state property. Palmer brought and won a
§ 1983 action at the trial level, claiming the shakedown search-done intentionally to
harass him-violated his fourteenth amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed
on the ground that state postdeprivation remedies provided all the process due.
74 See, e.g., Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542-44.
75 Parratthas proven to be a very difficult case to interpret and I will not attempt to
construct an interpretation. Professor Monaghan catalogs several possible interpretations and ultimately concludes that Parrattholds that a random and unauthorized tort
committed by a state official does not constitute state action under the fourteenth
amendment if the state provides adequate remedies. See Monaghan, supra note 11, at
998-99.
76 See Parratt,451 U.S. at 550 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). Justice Powell
read the majority opinion in Parrattto require states to provide a remedy for official
torts, thus overruling state immunities. Although he concurred in the result, Powell
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Yet, some lower courts, influenced by the Court's rhetoric favoring state
autonomy over official tort policy, have held that state immunities, even if
they completely bar recovery, do not render the state remedy inadequate. 7

argued that negligent acts do not "constitute a deprivation of property within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 546. Justice Powell's argument later
found its way into Daniels, which overruled Parratt on this issue. See Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
Professor Smolla also interprets Parrattto mean that if the state fails to provide a
remedy, a § 1983 due process action will provide one. Smolla, supra note 11, at
872-73. Smolla also insightfully adds that the state might be required to provide the
remedy itself because of its duty to enforce federal law under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947). See Smolla, supra note 11, at 873 n.183.
The Court has addressed the constitutionality of state immunities and upheld them
as a defense to a state court case, not a federal constitutional claim. See Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1980) (holding that federal courts should respect
state grant of official immunity unless "wholly arbitrary or irrational"). Smolla
argues that Parratt and Logan overrule Martinez to the extent that Martinez allows
state immunities to bar recovery in official tort situations: "[I]f the immunities
doctrines eviscerate common law rights without a sufficiently strong state reason, the
'adequacy' concept of Parrattand Zimmerman Brush should be triggered to create a
due process violation." Smolla, supra note 11, at 880.
" See Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1985). In Rittenhouse, the court held that states are free to grant immunities even if the immunities completely foreclose tort recovery as long as the immunities are not wholly
arbitrary or irrational. Id. at 1458 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U;S. 277 (1980));
accord, Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 830 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); see also Bacon v.
Patera, 772 F.2d 259, 264 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (indicating that police chief may be able
to assert qualified immunity even if plaintiff's procedural due process rights have
been violated); Al-Mustafa Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp. 922, 928-29 (E.D. Va. 1982)
(finding Virginia's immunity defense does not violate due process by drawing parallel
to federal immunity defense in § 1983 actions); Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574,
579-80 & n. 10 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that Maryland's qualified good faith immunity
does not violate due process requirements).
Only one court has held that adequate postdeprivation remedies might not exist
where state immunities bar recovery. See Lambert v. MacFarland, 612 F. Supp.
1252, 1267-68 (N.D. Gd. 1984). Other courts have intimated that state remedies may
not be adequate if immunity bars tort recovery, but have avoided addressing the
question directly by finding either that state immunity was inapplicable to the case at
bar, see, e.g., Rheuport v. Ferguson, 819 F.2d 1459, 1465-67 (8th Cir. 1987), or that
even if the named defendant is immune, state remedies are adequate so long as there
is some unimmunized party who could have been sued, see, e.g., Economic Dev.
Corp. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d 952, 955 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1986). These cases raise the
question of whether the takings clause should require parties who can be sued for
private torts to be equally amenable to suit in government tort cases. For example, it
is unclear whether the takings clause allows government to exempt itself from
vicarious liability on the same terms as private employers. The Supreme Court, in
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'Once again, the Court's focus on technical applications of the due process
clause, best captured in the distinction the Court draws between random and
unauthorized acts and established state procedures, allowed the Court to
duck the larger issue of the constitutionality of sovereign immunity from tort
actions. Following Parratt,one could argue that when state tort law denies a
claim on the basis of sovereign immunity, the system itself has caused the
deprivation.7 8 Because the procedural requirements of due process may
have been satisfied by the state court hearing in which the immunities were
applied, the Court would be forced to confront the substantive issues of the
constitutionality of the immunity under the "adequate state remedy" doc79
trine.
As noted, Parratt shifted the Court's attention from state liability for
official torts to whether a state remedy was adequate despite state immunities. 0 The Court was presented directly with the question in Daniels v.
Williams."1 Daniels presented the Court with a choice: it could bite the bullet
on federalism and hold that states must provide remedies for official torts, or
it could hold that a state remedy is adequate even if state immunities
prevented any realistic chance for the state tort victim to recover. The
former possibility did not comport with the Court's basic view of federalism.
The latter, however, seemed illogical. Under this second choice, the Court
would be holding that a remedy that is in fact nonexistent is an adequate
82
one.
Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), held
that local governments were not subject to vicarious liability under § 1983. However,
serious takings problems could arise if government tort victims were unable to
recover for their injuries because the officials could not satisfy judgments and
governmental units exempted themselves from vicarious liability. While this article
does not address these problems, the existence of vicarious liability could be important to the adequacy of any remedy for government torts.
78 This is the reasoning the Court used in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 433-38 (1982).
11 [T]he mere fact that a State elects to provide some of its agents with a
sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does not justify the conclusion that
its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate. There is no reason to believe
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislation
enacted pursuant to § 5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally
unfair.
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342-43 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
" See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
81 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
82 See Note, Parratt v. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REV. 607, 623-27 (1985) (arguing that state remedy is not adequate if
relief is barred by immunity defense); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174
(1961) (holding state remedies must be adequate in fact). The Court reiterated the
"adequacy in fact" requirement in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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The Court, in Daniels and its companion case, Davidson v. Cannon,83

skirted the issue of the immunities' constitutionality by holding that negligent conduct cannot effect a deprivation of an interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment. 84 Although the lower courts in both Daniels and
Davidson had held that a state remedy is adequate despite the sovereign

immunity defense,8 5 the Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality
of the immunities. Instead, the Court reiterated the concerns it raised in Paul
that the states should maintain their autonomy over tort law and federal
freedom from "trivial" tort cases motivated its decision. 86 According to the
Court:
8 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). In Daniels,

the prisoner was injured when he slipped and fell on a pillow left by a guard on the
stairs of the jail. In Davidson, the plaintiff alleged that prison officials failed to protect
him from another inmate who was known to have the threatened the plaintiff with
violence.
84 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 344. Justice Stevens,
relying on his opinion for the Court in Martinez, would have found the immunities
constitutional. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 342-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Stevens thinks that the immunities are constitutional so long as they meet
minimal substantive due process scrutiny-that is, they must rationally relate to a
legitimate state interest. Id.
The Court characterized Davidson's claim as founded on negligence. Justice
Blackmun argued in his dissent that the prison officials may have been reckless in
placing the plaintiff in a cell with an inmate who had threatened the plaintiff with
bodily injury. 474 U.S. at 349-60. The facts in Davidson resemble those in Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), a case in which an award of punitive damages against
prison officials was upheld on a finding of recklessness.
Justice Blackmun also rejects the Court's "rigid" holding that negligence can
never constitute a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 353. He would apply the Daniels
doctrine to create a de minimus exception to the fourteenth amendment due process
clause by looking at each case to determine whether there had been an "abuse of
governmental power." Id. If the negligence in a particular case amounted to an abuse
of governmental power, Blackmun would find a deprivation of liberty. Id. Basically,
Blackmun would give federal courts discretion to determine which cases should be
considered proper occasions for federal intervention.
Blackmun's approach has the virtue of bringing federalism concerns to the fore in
determining which cases should be within district court jurisdiction. He is mistaken,
however, to focus on the egregiousness of the conduct in the cases. On economic
grounds, it may be more accurate to view all accidents as intentional. The government chooses a level of care and knows that this level of care will produce a certain
number of accidents. The focus should be on whether the decision not to pay
damages is an abuse of governmental power, not on the accident-producing conduct
itself.
85 See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 798 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 830 (3d Cir. 1984)
(en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
86 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332-34; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48.
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[The Constitution] deals with the large concerns of the governors and
the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in
laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend

living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that
"would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be
superimposed
upon whatever systems may already administered by the
7
States[.]'"

8

Daniels only temporarily avoids the immunities issue because due process
requires adequate state remedies in cases of intentional, but random and

unauthorized, deprivations .88 Whether a state remedy is adequate if the
defendants are immune may yet come before the Court, although judging
from the past, the Court may find another technical due process doctrine to
89
avoid confronting the issue.

87

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (citations omitted).

There is also uncertainty over whether, after Daniels, all state tortious conduct
that is more than negligent-that is, grossly negligent, reckless, or intentionalconstitutes a deprivation. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Daniels bar to negligence actions under § 1983 is
inapplicable where prison official fails to protect prisoner from attack, because the
official's failure to protect constituted recklessness); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority in Davidson for elevating the Daniels bar on negligence in § 1983 actions to the level of "inflexible constitutional dogma"). According
to one court, even if conduct is more than negligent, Daniels also requires an "abuse
of government power that is necessary to raise an ordinary tort by a government
agent to the stature of a violation of the Constitution." Hogan v. City of Houston, 819
F.2d 604, 604 (5th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The courts have not, with any
precision, attempted to define "abuse of power."
89 The Court has already avoided this issue in cases of prisoners suing their
keepers for tortious injuries. In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Court
faced a claim that a prisoner's constitutional rights were violated when he was shot
during a prison disturbance. The prisoner, Albers, argued that the shooting was
unnecessary and therefore violated his eighth amendment and fourteenth amendment
due process rights. Id. at 326-27. The Court held that while the shooting may have
been unnecessary, it did not violate the eighth amendment because it was not done
with "obduracy and wantonness." Id. at 319. The Court also held that the "Due
Process Clause affords [prisoners] no greater protection than does the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause [of the eighth amendment]." Id. at 327. See also City of
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that the due
process rights of a person injured while being apprehended by the police are at least
as great as that person's eighth amendment rights). The Court in Whitley could have
distinguished Albers's claim from those raised in Daniels, Davidson, and Parratt on
the grounds that Albers had raised a substantive due process claim. Instead, the
Court linked Albers's claim with those raised in procedural due process. Id. By
raising the question left open in Daniels whether recklessness or gross negligence
constituted a deprivation prior to its substantive due process analysis, the Court
implied it would not limit the application of Daniels to only procedural due process
88
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Lurking behind the technicalities of due process doctrine, a number of
factors apparently motivate the Court's decisions in the official tort area.
First, the Court thinks that the Constitution should be read to deal with the
"large concerns of the governors and the governed." 90 More simply, the
federal courts should provide remedies for official torts only when there has
been an abuse of government power because federalism objections are not as
strong when such "large concerns" are implicated. 91 Second, state autonomy over tort law should be preserved to protect federalism values and to
prevent the federal courts from being flooded with "trivial" litigation. 92 The
adequate state remedies question, then, can be restated in the Court's terms
as a two-pronged inquiry: first, is the failure to provide a remedy an abuse of

cases. The Daniels negligence bar, interpreted in light of Whitley, may now mean that
prisoners make out a cause of action under § 1983 ofily when the alleged deprivation
violates the eighth amendment standards for deliberate indifference.
Another device the Court has consistently employed to skirt the difficult issues of
immunity and state sovereignty is to choose small tort claims by prisoners as the
vehicle for broad pronouncements on state tort law and the protections of the due
process clause. One may agree with Justice Rehnquist that a deputy sheriff's error in
leaving a pillow on a prison staircase should not give rise to a federal claim without
embracing all the consequences the Daniels decision may have in other contexts. It
may have been easier to persuade the more liberal members of the Court with the
facts of Daniels and Parratt than with the facts of more egregious cases that had been
denied review. See, e.g., Jackson v. Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In Jackson, police officers directed traffic around a
burning car without attempting to find out whether there were people inside the car.
The suit was brought by the representatives of people who were still in the car and
died. The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim upon Which
relief could be granted and the Supreme Court denied review. Id.
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), is the only § 1983 prisoner case which the
court could have perceived as more than a small tort claim. Although the type of
injury alleged-injury to a prisoner by another prisoner-is presumably common in a
prison setting, Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent that the issue at stake was
whether the state could ignore its duty to protect prisoners. Id. at 350 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[By incarcerating Davidson,] the State prevented Davidson from defending himself, and therefore assumed some responsibility to protect him from the
dangers to which he was exposed."). The reluctance of the majority in Davidson to
examine the issue raised by Justice Blackmun and the subsequent ease with which
the majority applied the Daniels bar to Davidson's case suggests that the Court may
be unwilling to face these issues even in cases to which they grant review. See
Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346 (1988) (finding that prison officials' callous
indifference in failing to protect plaintiff prisoner from other inmates could have
violated plaintiff's due process rights, and reversing trial court's granting of a
directed verdict against plaintiff).
90 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
91Id. at 331-32.
92

Id. at 332.
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government power, 93 and second, would state tort law be federalized if the
federal courts, under federal law, required states to provide remedies to
official tort victims? These two questions, and not technical implications of
procedural norms, should direct the inquiry into the constitutionality of state
immunities that permit states to deny compensation to their tort victims.
To summarize, procedural due process is not a promising avenue for
solving the problem of government official torts. First, due process addresses the procedures by which the deprivation occurred, but because the
victims of official torts are complaining about the lack of compensation for
their injuries, they are unlikely to receive the remedy they are seeking.
Second, procedural due process analysis tends to focus attention on the
particular deprivation, which may seem unimportant as a matter of federalstate relations, instead of on the larger issue of whether state governments
should be required to compensate their tort victims.
In the next section, I argue that the takings clause should be read to
require states to compensate their tort victims. The answers to the Court's
two due process concerns are addressed by takings clause analysis. The
takings clause points toward a compensation requirement to the extent that
immunities that allow government and government officials to avoid liability
in situations in which private parties would be liable constitute abuses of
government power. A compensation requirement under the takings clause
could be erected without running the risk that federal constitutional norms
would wrest control of state tort law from the states. Furthermore, the
values underlying the takings clause militate in favor of a compensation
requirement.

II.

OVERRIDING STATE IMMUNITIES WITH THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

In this section I address how the takings clause can be read to require
states to compensate their tort victims. The discussion proceeds on two
levels. First, in subsection A, I show how the state tort victim can establish
the elements of a takings claim. Second, in subsection B, I examine the two
main issues in the Supreme Court's official tort jurisprudence and conclude
that (a) the refusal to compensate tort victims is an abuse of government
power and (b) a federal requirement that states compensate their tort victims
would not make the federal Constitution "a font of tort law."
As noted in Section I, the traditional avenue of attack on state immunities
in the federal courts has been procedural due process. In the typical case,
the victim of a state tort will allege a deprivation of property or liberty
without due process of law. Resting the claim on the due process clause
forces the court to focus on three issues: whether there has been a deprivation, of an interest protected by the due process clause, and whether the
See Whitman, supra note 41, at 274 (questioning whether state decision to deny
remedy for official tort is an abuse of government power).
93
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deprivation was accomplished without due process of law.94 The well developed body of law concerning which private interests qualify as liberty and
property under the due process clause provides the starting point for the
analysis of private interests protected by the takings clause. Although the
Supreme Court has protected a wider range of private interests under due
process than under the takings clause, 95 I argue in this section that the
takings clause should protect all of the interests currently protected under
the due process clause, and possibly more.
A.

Establishing the Elements of the Takings Claim

To make out a claim under the takings clause, a plaintiff must show that
the plaintiff's: 1) property 2) was taken 3) for public use 4) without just
compensation 96
1.

97
Defining Property

Facially, the takings clause does not protect as wide a range of interests as
the due process clause. Due process protections extend to deprivations of
"life, liberty, or property," 98 while the takings clause requires compensation
for takings of "property" only. 99 But the word "property" in the takings
clause encompasses most, or all of the interests that the due process clause
protects. While I do not attempt a general definition of "property" in this
article, a brief excursion is necessary to outline my argument that most, if
not all, of the interests protected by the due process clause should be
protected by the takings clause.
(a) Traditionaland New Property. There is no question that the takings
clause protects against uncompensated takings of tangible real property and
tangible personal property. 00 The most obvious instances involve land and

I See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (applyingthe three-part due
process test).
11 See Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541, 543-45
(1984) (noting that takings clause analysis, unlike due process clause analysis, has
applied only to common law property).
96 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91 For a discussion of the relationship between takings law and tortious government conduct, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 35-56. For a discussion of the
interests that should be protected by the takings clause see infra notes 100-37 and
accompanying text.
9' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100 See Note, supra note 95, at 544-45; see also L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES 169-74 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court has used intuitive notions of
private property to establish traditional property rights under the takings clause).
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chattels. 10' If the government builds a road over land that is privately owned,
it has taken private property. Likewise, if the government seizes a private
automobile to use for mail delivery, it has taken private property.
With regard to government torts, property is obviously involved in some
of the cases. For instance, there is no doubt that the hobby kit in Parrattv.
Taylor was property.° 2 Other cases are more elusive. Personal injury cases,
03
like Daniels1
and Davidson '04 have been thought to implicate only liberty
interests, which receive protection under the due process clause, but not the
takings clause.105
The short doctrinal alternative to this position is that all causes of action
are property.10 6 A cause of action is something of value which in some
circumstances may be sold; it is property for the purposes of the takings and
due process clauses, first, because the holder of a cause of action has a
legitimate expectation that the claim will be recognized by state law, and
second, because all property is defined by the cause of action that is avail-

able to assert the property right.
This new concept of property, as those interests for which there is a cause
of action, has gained popularity over the last few decades. In his landmark
article, The New Property,' 0 7 Professor Reich argues that government
benefits-such as professional licenses, welfare benefits, and retirement
insurance-should be recognized as property interests and protected by the
due process and takings clauses. 10 8 The importance of private property,
according to Reich, is that it provides a boundary against government
interference with personal integrity and privacy. 0 9 To the extent that the
101 Colonial precursors to the federal constitution's takings clause protected
against takings of goods and chattel only and not land. Bender, The Takings Clause:

Principles or Politics?, 34

BUFFALO

L. REV. 735, 752 (1985).

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536 (1981).
13 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
114 Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
105 Further examples of government tort cases involving nontraditional property
interests include Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation) and Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of school children).
106 See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1344-45
(1988) (holding that cause of action is property); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 428-33 (1982) (holding that dismissal of employment discrimination
charge due to state commission's failure to hold a timely conference deprived
appellant of a property interest protected by the due process clause); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (considering as property
the right of beneficiaries of a trust fund to bring action against trustee).
107 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
102

108

Id.

Reich's argument is premised mainly on his identification of the purpose of
property law as containment "of governmental power over individuals." Id. at 771;
see also Tushnet, supra note 16, at 985-86 (arguing that property ownership promotes
"the ordered dimension of liberty" and ensures domestic tranquility).
109
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"new property" performs the same function as the old, it too should be
protected through procedural norms and compensation requirements from
11 0
government encroachment.
The Supreme Court has at least partially accepted Reich's reconstitution
-of the domain of constitutional protection of property.111 The Court has
extended due process protection to various sorts of government benefits, but
only to the extent that the law creating the interest limits government
discretion to recognize the right.1 1 2 If state law (or any less formal under-

'10 Reich's approach has been criticized as too narrow because both the recipients'
needs and protection of individual liberty make protection of welfare rights important. See Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44

MD.

L.

REV.

1, 26-27 (1985). Under current Supreme Court doctrine, there is no constitutionally
recognized right to basic human necessities. For an argument that due process and
equal protection should be read to require government provision of basic human
necessities, see Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987).

"I Many problems with the Supreme Court's current approach to property and
liberty interests will not be discussed here. For a critique of the Supreme Court's
reliance on state law in determining the existence of property interests, see
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
Monaghan argues that the significance of the interest, not the statutory language of
the state-law entitlement, should be the key to determining whether due process
protections should be invoked. Id. at 439-42.
11
See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-03 (1972) (acknowledging
that a property interest in continued state employment exists where state created
expectation that firing would be only for cause). This is described as a positivist
definition of property because the existence of property depends on some aspect of
positive law, i.e. law enacted by government.
Under the Court's due process regime, a hearing is only required if the plaintiff can
establish the existence of an entitlement: no entitlement, no hearing. Professor Rubin
criticizes the Court's all-or-nothing approach to the hearing requirement on the
ground that it is insensitive to reasons for holding hearings. He favors an approach
that allows courts to determine, independent of the formal question of the existence
of property, whether a hearing would be a good idea:
To be sure, translating questions about the scope of administrative discretion
into discussions of the terms "liberty" and "property" as the Court has done,
achieves a certain linguistic economy. It takes a necessary concept with no
direct textual reference, and attaches it to a phrase in the text with no other
obvious function. But while that seems convenient, it does not work; the phrase
and the concept are really unrelated, and one distorts the other ....
The phrase
"life, liberty, or property" ...
provides us with no content for analyzing
particular actions ....

Although the conceptual framework of the post-Roth cases is unworkable, the
issues that the Court has confronted in these cases are real ....

When magic

solutions based on invocations of the terms "liberty" and "property" are
abandoned, it becomes clear that the answer depends on one's views about a
variety of issues: the proper role of constitutional courts, the proper balance
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standing with the state 1 3) does not limit the state's discretion to withdraw
the benefit, then the interest is not recognized as property regardless of the
114
importance of the private interest in continuation of the benefit.
The Court has not adopted the concept of "new property" for takings
clause purposes. 1 5 This dichotomy in the definition of property may lie in
the Court's failure to recognize that the "new property's" positivist definition of property' 16 is no different from the way traditional property comes
into existence. As the Court itself has repeatedly noted, the Constitution
does not itself create property interests; property interests arise from other
sources, most notably from state law.1 7 State law, in turn, grants property
rights by granting the owner rights, such as the right to exclude others and
the right to use the property for lawful purposes. These rights are granted
through state tort, property, and contract law. When these rights are compromised, the owner can bring a cause of action to vindicate them. Because

between state and federal power, the degree to which administrative agencies
treat individuals unfairly, the causes of such unfairness, the significance of such
unfairness, and the ability of courts to provide a cure for it.
Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1152-53
(1982).
113 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 600-03 (holding that state college's informal tenure
policy created constitutionally protected property interest).
114 Reich would have the existence of property interests determined solely by
reference to their importance in protecting liberty; even if government retained the
power to withdraw a benefit at-will, it might be required to pay compensation:
The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his license, and
the welfare recipient his pension. These interests should be "vested." If revocation is necessary, not by reason of the fault of the individual holder, but by
reason of overriding demands of public policy, perhaps payment of just compensation would be appropriate. The individual should not bear the entire loss for a
remedy primarily intended to benefit the community.
Reich, supra note 107, at 785. The existence of property is thus insensitive to the
importance of the private interest at stake. Because under current law the state's
discretion, and not the liberty-protecting potential of the interest, determines
whether a property right is recognized, this analysis will achieve the goal of protecting liberty in a somewhat "random" fashion. Williams, Liberty and Property: The
Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 13 (1983). Interests important to individual liberty might not be protected because state discretion is insufficiently limited to create an interest. A more complete protection of liberty could
be achieved by recognizing that all causes of action are property. Constitutional
protection would thereby be extended to all legal mechanisms for protecting personal
freedom, dignity, and autonomy. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
15
116

See Note, supra note 95, at 544-45.
See supra note 112.

"I See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property
interests ... are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.").

1988]

OFFICIAL TORTS & THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

there is no constitutional or common law definition of property, the Court
should recognize that the "new property" is just as deserving of takings
clause protection as traditional property.
Causes of action are property under an analysis similar to that which led
the Court to recognize the "new property" in the due process context." 8 A
cause of action against a private party is the right to press a claim against that
party and have it judged by substantive standards known as the elements of
the cause of action. A party who can establish the elements of a cause of
action has a property interest in using the state's adjudicatory mechanism to
vindicate the rights protected by the substantive law.119 Indeed, the existence of causes of action against parties who interfere with the enjoyment of
property is the basis of the claim to property itself. 120 The legal standards
under which the claim is judged set the limits to rights of possession and use
of real and personal property. Having a cause of action against the government means setting legal limits on the government's ability to remove benefits or to interfere with personal integrity. The contours of causes of action
are set by legal standards sufficiently clear to allow claims of entitlement
2
under the "new property" doctrine.' 1
(b) Liberty and Propertyin Causes of Action. If one accepts that causes of
action are property under the takings clause, liberty interests, insofar as they
are protected by tort causes of action, should also be protected. 22 Paul v.

18 Property rights and private causes of action protect against domination of
individuals by setting limits to permissible interference and coercion. Thus, under
Reich's analysis, causes of action to vindicate rights against private parties should
also be protected by the Constitution.
"1
See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) ("the hallmark

of property ...

is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be

removed except for cause.") (citations omitted); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 281-82 (1980) ("Arguably, [a state tort claim] is a species of 'property' protected
by the Due Process Clause."); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (beneficiary's cause of action against trustee is property); see
also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984) (holding that trade
secrets protected by common law are property protected by the fifth amendment's
takings clause).
120The example of adverse possession illustrates this point most clearly. In adverse possession, the adverse possessor becomes the owner when the statute of
limitations runs on the former owner's cause of action for trespass. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 757-64 (1984).
12
Alternatively, a cause of action might be thought of as an entitlement to employ
the state's adjudicatory machinery which can only be denied for cause, cause being
the failure to establish the elements of the cause of action or to comply with
reasonable procedural requirements. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982).
122 The federal component to the definition of "liberty" is more expansive than the
federal component to the definition of property. For example, a state could not justify
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Davis 113 provides a good example of this point. In Paul, the plaintiff claimed
that he had been defamed by a government official. State substantive law
protected the plaintiff's reputation by establishing the elements of a cause of
action for defamation. Under the "new property" doctrine, then, the plaintiff would have a property interest in the cause of action to protect his
reputation. This analysis applies to traditional liberty interests, such as
freedom from physical restraint, 124 and contemporary liberty doctrine, such
as the right to be free from stigmatizing defamation. 125 Whether a liberty
interest exists is thus determined by deciding whether similar activity by a
private party would create a cause of action in tort. Tort causes of action
prescribe limits to both private and government infringement of private
interests and thus are analogous to actions to vindicate rights in traditional
property and in "new property." By protecting private interests in causes of
action, "property" under the takings clause encompasses both "property"
and "liberty" under the due process clause. 126

arbitrary imprisonment of individuals by eliminating the tort of false imprisonment
without running afoul of constitutional protections. There is also a federal element to
the definition of property, but it is not articulated in the cases. See Monaghan, supra
note 111, at 440 (arguing that the sufficiency of a claim of entitlement must be
determined by reference to federal law); Rubin, supra note 112, at 1078 ("[T]he
existence of such a legitimate claim is a federal question to be determined by an
independent reading of the statute."). The difference between the two is that liberty
interests can sometimes be determined solely by reference to federal law, while
property interests must be identified, at least in part, with state law.
123 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
124 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (applying
analysis to
protection from corporal punishment).
125 Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976) (holding that, although defamation by itself did not constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest, defamation which
resulted in loss of other liberty or property interests did). For a critique of Paul, see
Monaghan, supra note 111, at 423-29.
126 This apparent congruence between liberty and property for takings clause
purposes is faithful to the textual differentiation between liberty and property in the
due process clause. Some federally recognized liberty interests are not protected by
state tort law. In these cases, the distinction between liberty and property remains
important. However, in many cases the distinction between liberty and property is
unimportant and not specifically demarcated. Under the new property analysis, many
interests may be characterized as either liberty or property because their existence is
determined under identical analyses, i.e. by looking to whether state law creates an
entitlement to the interest. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1,
7-16 (1979) (applying Roth analysis to determine whether liberty interest attaches to
parole); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-25 (1976) (applying same analysis to
determine whether liberty interest exists regarding transfer from medium to maximum security prison). However, in other situations, liberty is defined without reference to state law. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977) (liberty
interest exists in freedom from physical restraint and corporal punishment regardless
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(c) Immunities and the Existence of Property. One could argue that immunities, both sovereign and official, are state substantive provisions that
limit ownership of property. In other words, no one "owns" property to the
extent that it might be damaged by immune officials or an immune state, and
therefore there is no cause of action. 12 7 This objection is answerable. Immunities should not be treated as substantive limitations on the existence of
property interests for reasons that lie at the heart of the takings clause.
Rejection of my argument here entails rejection of the takings clause as a
viable limitation on state power to impose the costs of government inequita-

bly.
It would be fundamentally at odds with the principles underlying the
takings clause to allow states to condition entitlements on the right to
destroy the entitlement. While states have substantial freedom to decide
whether to create substantive rights such as ownership rights, takings clause
principles must limit the states' ability to build into all entitlements the
power to trump substantive law. Without this limitation, states could avoid
the proscriptions of the takings clause altogether simply by passing statutes
making themselves immune from all tort and contract actions.1 2s If states

of relevant state law). Interests in cases like Greenholtz and Meachum are called
"liberty" because they look more like federally defined liberty interests. In principle,
however, there is no difference between state-created property and liberty interests.
For example, it is not self-evident that employment, protected under the Roth
analysis, should be characterized as property rather than liberty.
For takings purposes, state-created property and liberty interests are protected
under the "new property" doctrine. Federally created liberty interests are not
protected unless state law also grants a cause of action for protection of that interest.
Thus, property and liberty in the due process clause are not coterminous under the
"new property" analysis.
127 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (acknowledging
that immunities arguably limit the scope of plaintiffs' property rights); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n.5 (1980) ("It is arguable ... that the immunity
defense, like an element of the tort claim itself, is merely one aspect of the State's
definition of that property interest.").
An example clarifies the arguments that immunities limit the scope of property.
Consider individual ownership of a car. An individual is said to own an automobile
because the individual has the right to exclude others from using the automobile, and
a right to collect compensation from a person who negligently damages it. It could be
argued that if state officials or the state is immune from suit, the individual's
ownership rights are limited by the immunity-in other words, the individual does
not have a property right in the automobile as against an immune tortfeasor.
128 Admittedly, the state is restrained from redefining common law rights in this
way by the possibility that the change from the common law would amount to a
taking against the owners at -thetime the change in common law was made. However,
unless the courts recognize that state invasions of common law rights are takings,
there is no objection in principle to the state changing the common law in its favor.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 277

were allowed to build immunities into the definition of property, then no
takings claim could ever succeed without the state's consent. The state
could decide, for instance, that all property, as a matter of common law, is
subject to an easement for roadways. The owner of the property would have
no recourse via the takings clause because the owner did not actually own
the right to exclude users of the easement and thus no property interest was
taken. Reading limitations on the enjoyment of property in favor of the state
into the question whether property exists in the first place would thus allow
states to subvert the operation of the takings clause. 12 9
Immunities may be more properly described as procedural-not
substantive-limitations on a litigant's property rights. Consequently, immunities should not bar a takings claim. This classification is not obvious,
owing in large part to the murkiness of the line the Court draws between
procedural and substantive limitations, At the extreme of the procedural end
lie defenses such as statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. At the
extreme of the substantive end are claims such as contributory negligence,
which limit the scope of the property right. Immunities fall somewhere in the
middle. 130 Immunities, though, should be thought of as procedural limTo some extent, states are able to prevent some interests from becoming
property by shaping substantive law so that it does not create a legitimate expectation
of an entitlement. See supra note 50. However, the state cannot completely avoid
creating property interests by formally declaring in its substantive law that individuals have no entitlement. The Court has recognized that the state may, through
actions and policies less formal than actual law, create expectations that should be
recognized as property interests. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-03
(1972). This injects a federal element to the definition of property-albeit a narrow
one-which is designed to avoid the injustice that could result if states could defeat
property claims with technicalities of state law that have not been honored in
practice. See Monaghan, supra note 111, at 440 (arguing that claim of entitlement
must be evaluated under federal law).
Because the Supreme Court refuses to recognize that all property interests, not just
the "new property," are established by state law, it has not analyzed traditional
property claims under the legitimate expectations approach. For example, in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988), the Court held that private
property owners did not own tidal lands despite the fact that they "had long been the
record title holders [and had] long paid taxes on these lands[.]" Id. at 799. The Court
held that whether these facts would transfer ownership from the state to the claimants was a matter of state law. Id. Mississippi claimed ownership of the land under
the public trust doctrine. Id. at 793. The Court agreed with Mississippi and held that
ownership of the tidal land was transferred to the state from the federal government
when Mississippi had been admitted to the Union. Id. at 793-95. Viewed under the
legitimate expectations analysis of Perry, the ownership claims of the private land
owners would have been much stronger.
130 Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Daniels and Davidson, lumped together
immunities, statutes of limitations, and defenses of contributory negligence as permissible defenses to § 1983 actions so long as they are not fundamentally unfair.
Daniels, 474 U.S. 327, 342-43 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
1219
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itations because they are not connected to the plaintiff's ownership of the
property or the plaintiff's conduct in the world but instead are linked to
factors that arise only in the context of a suit against the government
official. 13 1 Following this reasoning, immunities, like statutes of limitations,
limit the enforcement of the property right, not the property right's actual
scope.
The only way to save the takings clause from extinction while simultaneously allowing the immunities to function as limitations on the property
interests is to maintain what I believe is the untenable distinction between
traditional property and the "new property," and then allow immunities to
limit only claims of entitlement to the "new property." This would preserve
the operation of the takings clause against state destruction of traditional
property. The problem with this tactic is that there is no logically coherent
way to distinguish between traditional and new property. All property interests are created by the combination of state law and the expectations created
by state law and practice.132
The creation of property interests, as noted above,' 3 3 depends largely on
the legitimate expectations of the parties, most often on the expectation that
they will be compensated for torts committed by the government. While
these expectations may not be unilateral on the claimant's behalf,13 4 it is not
necessary that the claimant's expectations comport exactly with state law.
Expectations may be reasonable even if they conflict with state law in two
situations: informal state practice contrary to the strict requirements of state
law may create property interests,'3 and state procedural law which would

131See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, state law
required that a hearing on the plaintiff's employment discrimination claim be held
within 120 days or the claim would be extinguished. The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the 120 day rule was a substantive limitation on the right to bring a private
employment discrimination claim and that the passing of 120 days without a hearing
extinguished the claim. The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the elements of the cause of action for employment discrimination created an
entitlement and that the 120 day rule was a procedural limitation that was inadequate
under due process. See id. at 431-38. The state's characterization of the 120 day rule
as substantive was irrelevant to its classification for federal due process purposes. Id.
132 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-03 (1972) (holding that the absence of
specific provisions concerning discharge of teacher for cause did not foreclose the
possibility that the teacher had a property interest in continued employment).
133 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
114 To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
135 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 600-03 (holding that state college's informal tenure
system created a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment).
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preclude assertion of the entitlement has been held not to bar the existence
36
of a property right.1
There is an obviously normative element to the analysis of reasonable
expectations. Claims of entitlement should be analyzed in light of the taking
clause's fairness concern that the costs of government be socialized and not
unfairly borne by a few individuals. Reasonable expectations analysis is not
a factual matter that can be proved or disproved by a survey, even though
the expectations of the "owners" are of primary importance. Immunities
should not be held to limit property interests. People expect the state to
compensate its tort victims and that individuals should not be forced to bear
the cost of government.
This does not mean that the state cannot ever diminish the value of private
property without paying compensation. To the contrary, states have substantial power to advance the public interest by regulating the use of private
property, even if such regulation diminishes the value of the property. 137 The
line between permissible regulation and takings is not a bright one, and there
is no logical way to make the distinction. But the demand for logic would
doom all law, and if the burdens placed on the victim of the government tort
should, as a matter of fairness, be borne by the entire community and not by
the individual, then the immunities should not bar the operation of the
takings clause. Furthermore, the question of whether regulations granting
immunities go too far is a question of whether there has been a taking, not
whether property exists.
2.

Defining a Taking

A taking of property occurs when the state interferes with property rights
either by occupying or damaging the property or by regulating the use of the
property to an extent that is beyond what federal law permits without
compensation. 1 8 Cases arising under the first half of this definition are
usually easy ones, such as when the state requires property owners to make
an easement across their properties to increase use of nearby public prop-

" See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-38 (1982) (holding that
120 day period for agency to hold hearing under state antidiscrimination law deprived
petitioner' of property right without due process when failure to hold hearing was
agency's fault); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (holding that
entitlement to public education cannot be revoked without fair procedures required
by due process).
137Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every change in the general law ...
and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, that
government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized
economic values.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
131See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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erty.13 9 The second half of this definition is circular, and the real difficulties
in takings law begin when the courts attempt to decide whether regulation
40
has passed beyond the boundaries of federal law and is therefore a taking.
Tortious interference by the state with any legally protected interest should
be considered a taking. Immunities should not be allowed to stand in the way
of compensation.
To understand why all uncompensated torts committed by the state and
state officials who are immune from suit are takings, it is important to clarify
what the state has done in committing the tort. A state official has committed
an act that would be tortious if done by a private party, and the conduct has
injured someone's person or property. 14 ' The state then responded to the
claim for damages from the private individual by granting immunity to itself
(sovereign immunity) and its official. In takings terms, the tort may be
characterized as the taking-either of traditional property damaged or destroyed or of the legitimate expectation that the state will respect legally
protected interests' 42-and the defendant's assertion of the immunity or its

- Had [the state] simply required [property owners] to make an easement across
their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase
139

public access to the beach ...

we have no doubt there would have been a taking."

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987). Likewise,
accidental destruction of traditional property has long been considered a taking of
property requiring compensation. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 176-81 (1872) (holding that state unconstitutionally took plaintiff's property without compensation when it built a dam that caused flooding and destruction
of plaintiff's property); see also R. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 38 ("The eminent
domain clause must apply whether government takes or destroys property").
140 For example, zoning regulation and landmark designation, which preclude
development of property to its full physical and economic potential, often present
difficult takings issues. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123-28 (holding that
designation of building as a landmark, although it restricted exploitation of the
property, did not constitute a taking). But the inquiry into what constitutes a taking is
often motivated by a concern for the values underlying the takings clause. These
values derive from the concern that the costs of government not be shifted unfairly
from the many onto the few:
[The just compensation clause] prevents the public from loading upon one
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that
when he surrenders to the public something more and different than which is
exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be
returned to him.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893); accord
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1256 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
141 1 am assuming that the act was committed in the course of state activity so that
the conduct would be considered state action.
142 This distinction is unimportant for takings clause purposes. If, however, this
analysis were applied to the "deprivation" part of a due process claim, how one
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acceptance by the court as a refusal to compensate. 4 3
Focusing on the tort makes the taking look like a random and unauthorized act, and not an act of the state. In due process cases, the Court has
shown an unwillingness to subject the random and unauthorized torts of
individual officials to constitutional scrutiny. 14 4 Likewise, the Court may be
unwilling to subject random and unauthorized torts of individual officers to
takings clause scrutiny. If negligence is not a deprivation of a protected
interest under the due process clause, the Court could argue, a negligent act
is not a taking for just compensation purposes. 4 5 But such an argument
mischaracterizes the notion of a taking. The state grant of the immunity
defense to itself and its officials should be viewed as a component of the
taking. A taking occurs not merely because a tort is committed, but because
it is committed with impunity.
The immunities are not random occurrences; they are granted to advance
government policies. There is a substantial body of literature that explains
sovereign and official immunity in policy terms. 4 6 Sovereign immunity protects state policymaking from the harmful effects ofjudicial second guessing;
official immunity ensures that individual officials' formulation and execution
of policies that fiight-cause injuries to private parties will not be chilled by
the threat of litigation and damage awards. These policies are advanced at
the expense of individual victims of government torts. The special treatment

characterizes the tort would be important because the tortfeasor's state of mind when
damaging or destroying property may differ from the tortfeasor's state of mind when
the tortfeasor denies the legitimate expectation that the state will respect legally
protected interests.
113 The victim's federal takings claim does not arise until after both the taking and
the refusal to compensate. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985) (dismissing plaintiff's takings claim on
ripeness grounds because the state government had not reached a final decision
regarding application of the regulations in question, and because plaintiff did not seek
compensation through state-prescribed procedures).
144 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (prison official's negligence
in leaving pillow on staircase); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (prison
official's negligence in failing to protect inmate from other inmates).
115 One could argue that a random and unauthorized tort of a state official is not an
"abuse of government power" and the Constitution therefore should not be read to
address such torts. Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that prison
official's negligence in leaving a pillow on a staircase which resulted in plaintiff's
injury did not constitute a constitutional deprivation). If the focus is on the denial of
compensation rather than on the tortious conduct, then randomness should not be a
problem.
146

See, e.g., P.

SCHUCK,

supra note 11; Cass, Damage Suits Against Public

Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806-08 (1982) (explaining importance of protecting officials from the threat of
lawsuits).
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that government takes for itself by exempting itself and its employees from
tort liability is a deliberate policy choice of the government and should be
subject to scrutiny under the takings clause when property is damaged or
destroyed.
There are two different theories under which destruction of nontraditional
property constitutes a taking. First, because individuals have property interests in nontraditional property, tortious government activity takes that property when it damages it or destroys it. 14 7 Second, official tort plaintiffs have
property interests in their causes of action. Such causes of action entitle the
plaintiff to a hearing on the merits of the claim and to a remedy if the
elements of the claim are made out. These property interests are taken when
the government or government official asserts the immunity and the immunity is accepted by the courts.
Because the second takings theory involves intangible property and (obviously) nonphysical destruction of that property, the Supreme Court would
probably apply the analysis it uses in regulatory takings cases to determine
whether the immunities constitute a taking.'48 The Court applies a regulatory
takings analysis to determine whether regulation of property restricts the
owners rights so much that, in effect, the property has been taken by the
government. The Court does not have a clearly defined test for determining
whether regulation effects a taking, but it does rely on a consideration of
three factors: "(1) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant';
(2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations'; and (3) 'the character of the governmental
action.' "149 In addition to these factors, the Court sometimes considers the
more abstract question whether fairness requires that the political community as a whole bear the costs of the regulation and that the costs not be
placed on individual property holders. 150
The first two factors are ill-suited to the government tort problem because
they are designed to answer the takings question involving regulation of
economic or business property, not personal property. But nothing in the
takings clause indicates that the just compensation requirement applies only
147 Cf.. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), where the Court held that,
because plaintiff's reputation would have been damaged had the regents of the state
college failed to renew his employment contract, and because the state arguably had
established a de facto tenure policy, plaintiff could sue for a deprivation of property
under the due process clause.
148 See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2081-84 (1987) (applying regulatory takings
analysis to federal statute prohibiting passing, at death, of certain property owned by

Native Americans).
149Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
150 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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to business property. Personal interests should be protected as well. The
factors have been fine-tuned somewhat to determine whether personal property has been taken.'

These factors indicate that the relatively small economic impact of many
official torts would weigh against a finding of a taking. In the official tort
area, however, the nature of the injury, and not the individualized economic
effect of that injury, should lead to the conclusion that official torts are
takings because official torts as a class can have a substantial economic
effect. In cases in which government action has had a small effect on the
individual victim, the Court has considered the potential economic impact
on the class of interests affected in its determination of whether a taking has
occurred. 52 Even without substantial economic effect, government torts
should be considered takings because takings norms apply equally to valuable and less valuable property interests. 53
The second factor considered by the Court, the extent to which regulation
disturbs investment-backed expectations, is also important to determining
whether a taking has occurred. But the fact that certain property is not held
for investment purposes should not weigh against a finding that the property
has been taken. Although a narrow, straightforward application of this test
might indicate that noninvestment property deserves less takings protection
than investment property, noninvestment property deserves takings protection as much as, if not more than, business property.1 54 Protecting
investment-backed expectations should be viewed as analogous to the due
process test for determining whether a property interest exists. Under both
the investment-backed test and due process, the Court looks to whether
there is some basis for determining that government assurances, in the form
of pretaking regulation, have given the private party a reasonable expectation that the personal or investment use of the property will be allowed.

151See

Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3020-21 (1987) (replacing interference

with economic "investment-backed expectations" factor with interference with

"vested protectable interest" as test for determining whether a taking has occurred).
12 See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987) (considering impact of federal
statute on land owners in general as well as on plaintiffs).
15 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131 (1978) (rejecting appellant's
argument that a city law effects a taking solely when property value has been
significantly diminished); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 178-79 (criticizing
Court's ad hoc and anachronistic approach in determining whether property has been
taken within the meaning of the fifth amendment).
154 See Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting
Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179 (1983).
Judson argues that the Constitution protects noneconomic interests as well as economic interests, and that personal property safeguards the liberty of private individuals so that they may pursue happiness and participate in the political system. Id. at
216-18.
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Moreover, the Court has recognized that some property not held for investment nevertheless should be protected under the investment-backed expectations factor if the private party has a reasonable expectation that the
property interest will not be disturbed by regulation. In the'recent case of
Bowen v. Gilliard,'155 the plaintiff claimed that her property interest in welfare and child support benefits had been taken without just compensation. In
the course of denying that property had been taken, the Court substituted, as
the second factor in the takings test, the inquiry whether the child had a
"vested protectable interest" in continued support payments. 156 In doing so,
the Court recognized that, in nonbusiness settings, this factor should look to
whether and to what degree property interests-and not merely unilateral
157
expectations-are disrupted by government regulation.
When an official commits a tort, the victim's legitimate expectations,
created and protected by tort law, are disturbed. Private parties have "vested protectable interests" in their personal property and in causes of action
to vindicate damage to their reputations and other personal interests that can
be injured by official torts. The immunities destroy these vested interests
without compensation. This factor weighs in favor of finding a taking.
The objection might be made that no "vested protectable interests" are
implicated by official torts because the immunities themselves, as part of
state law, should be understood to destroy any legitimate expectation that
compensation will be granted. Private parties, the argument goes, do not
have security under state law from government invasion of personal interests such as personal property and reputation. But, as previously discussed,
property interests are not limited by the immunities, 158 and neither should
the vested interests protected under the takings clause. Moreover, this
argument-that state law itself restricts the application of the takings clause
to official torts, by essentially incorporating official immunities into the
definition of property for takings clause purposes-cannot coexist with
takings clause principles. Sovereign and official immunities must be overruled by the takings clause. 1 9 The takings clause requires states to compensate private parties for property taken, and states cannot avoid the operation
of the takings clause by redefining property to include the possibility of
government destruction.16 If one conceives of property rights as sticks in a
,5 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987).
ld. at 3020.
I6
"57

158
1"I

Id. at 3020-21.
See supra notes 100-37 and accompanying text.
Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107

S. Ct. 2378, 2386 n.9 (1987) ("[I]t is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for
interference with property rights that amounts to a taking.").
160 Property interests are formed by expectations created by understandings with
the state, either through law or some other, less formal, understanding. See supra
notes 106-17 and accompanying text. Procedural limitations on enforcement of prop-
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legal bundle of rights, when the state redefines property it removes some of
these sticks. 161 The takings clause does not prevent states from removing
sticks altogether. Rather, it establishes that if too many are removed, or if
those removed are too important, a taking has occurred, and the owner must
be compensated.
The final factor considered in regulatory takings cases-the character of
the government action-also points toward finding a taking in the case of
government torts. In tort cases involving destruction of traditional property,
the government action completely destroys property interests. In cases of
property damage not resulting in complete destruction, property damage has
been equated with destruction for takings purposes. 162 Personal interests,
like the interest in one's reputation, should be treated similarly. When
government tortiously injures these personal interests and then refuses to
compensate, it is turning its enormous power on private parties who are
,completely defenseless because the government has exempted itself from
the mandates of its own legal system.1 63 This use of unbridled force against

erty interests do not limit those interests because they are not part of private parties'
understanding of the contours of their rights. Similarly, people expect that they own
their personal property and that they have a sphere of personal sanctity. It would be
surprising if people expected that their personal property and security were always at
risk from invasion by government without possibility of compensation. That these
expectations are not fully consistent with law is not a fatal objection, because the
expectations that give rise to property interests can be created with less formal
understandings. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (holding that
state college's informal tenure process created a property interest for due process
purposes). This is analogous to the reliance doctrine in contract law: promises are
made enforceable due to the reasonable expectations of the promisee even though
under traditional consideration requirements no enforceable contract was made.
161See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (1987) (applying analogy of rights
as a bundle of sticks, and concluding that regulation that abrogates property owners'
right to transfer property through testamentary disposition without providing compensation is an unconstitutional taking).
162See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (1987) (affirming the holding in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872), that property damage that does not result in total destruction of the property still constitutes a taking).
163 One could argue that the character of the government action, at least in
negligence cases, is not an abuse of government power and therefore not a matter for
federal concern under Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). It is important here
to analyze the refusal to compensate, and not the tortious conduct itself, to determine
whether a taking occurred. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text for a
discussion of whether the refusal to compensate should be considered an abuse of
government power.
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individuals motivates the prohibition against takings without compensation.

164

The Supreme Court has also indicated that assessing the character of the
government action incorporates the general fairness inquiry of whether the
government action unfairly burdens a small class of individuals for the
benefit of the community. 1 5 Official torts should be viewed as a situation in
which the interests of a few are unfairly sacrificed to the general good
because the policies behind sovereign and official immunities are attuned to
greater government efficiency. Insofar as sovereign immunity makes government cheaper to operate by allowing government to expend fewer resources for safeguards against tortious injuries to private parties, the immunity obviously disadvantages victims for the community's sake. 166 But even
the official immunities act similarly, because they are based on a policy of
preventing the "fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation

See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389 (1987) ("M]any of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit
the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities and the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them."); Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United
States, 723 F.2d 884, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the purpose and function of the
takings clause is to secure citizens against governmental expropriation, and to
guarantee just compensation for the property taken); see also supra note 140.
165 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3021 (1987) (holding that federal statute
does not force " 'some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' ") (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
166 Ido not mean to imply that whenever an individual's property is regulated and
its value substantially reduced, a court should find a taking. There are many well
established situations in which government regulation may reduce the value of
property without incurring takings liability. If a use of private property is a nuisance,
the value of the property may be significantly reduced by regulation to abate the
nuisance. Further, in a government tort situation, if the private party cannot establish
the elements of the tort, or if the government has a defense, such as the negligence of
the plaintiff, then no liability should attach. When government regulates the use of
private property through zoning laws and the like, the factors outlined above will
guide the inquiry. But ultimately, all property in our society is subject to a fair
amount of regulation for the public good; and usually unless all reasonable profitable
use of property is prohibited, courts will conclude that no taking has occurred. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135-38 (1978) (holding that
no taking had occurred where plaintiffs could still use the property in a manner
similar to how it had always been used). Likewise, even if all profitable use had been
prohibited, the regulation may be justified by the police power to protect the public
health and welfare of society, and no compensation may be required. Id. at 125. The
ad hoc takings analysis allows the courts to consider all of the relevant factors, such
as the fairness of placing the burden of a policy on individuals, the threat that
uncompensated takings pose to political freedom and personal liberty, and the threat
to government efficiency if a regulation is deemed a taking.
164
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[from] unduly inhibit[ing] officials in the discharge of their duties.", 6 7 The
benefits of freeing officials from this fear inure to the entire community,
while the burdens fall on the unlucky tort victims. If both the government
and the officials are immune, the unfortunate victims of official
torts bear
168
costs that should be borne by the community as a whole.
The fairness inquiry underlying takings law is uncertain and there is no
well developed theory to distinguish between permissible reductions in value
and regulation that "goes too far" amounting to a taking. 16 9 To some extent,
the fairness issue is an intuitive assessment, with issues regarding the existence of implicit in-kind compensation 70 and the expectation that property
Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
168This fairness inquiry is closely analogous to economic arguments that parties
should not be allowed to externalize their costs. If government can place the costs of
its operation on third parties, government may not be as careful as it would be if it
were forced to pay damages for the harm it causes. Therefore, government services
might be overproduced relative to private services subject to tort law. In some
situations, however, the good from exempting government from tort law may outweigh the harm. Frank Michelman refines this point and argues that in certain
situations, the state's decision not to compensate should be upheld because the
decision is based on an ex ante efficiency judgment that rational property owners
would agree to. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1219-22 (applying the Rawlsian theory
of justice as fairness to questions of compensation for tort victims, and concluding
that the crucial question in determining whether to compensate is which general
principles maximize claimants' opportunities over a fixed time span). Michelman
points out that stringent compensation requirements could put cost-effective projects
at risk and that property owners will agree to forgo short-run compensation in
anticipation of the long-term benefits of the project. This is a powerful argument in
support of immunizing a certain amount of regulation like zoning from takings attack.
However, the argument ignores the counterargument that society as a whole can
foresee long-term benefits as well as the individual can, and could therefore pay
compensation and complete the project. If justified compensation demands were
greater than the benefits of a project, so that the state would rather scrap the project
than pay compensation, the project would not be cost-effective in the first place.
Because costs would exceed the benefits, only the noncompensation decision would
allow the project to go forward, allowing the government to redistribute the costs to
the disadvantage of a few individuals. Ultimately, the inquiry returns to the basic
question whether fairness should require society, rather than the individual, to bear
the cost of the tortious conduct.
'169
See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973)
(suggesting that, due to the paucity of theoretical elements available for deciding
takings claims, each takings claim must be decided on its own individual facts).
170The existence of implicit in-kind compensation has been recognized as a factor
weighing against finding a taking. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 195-215 (arguing
that to measure the impact of the taking, one must consider not only whether there
was a taking, but if the restrictions imposed by the legislation upon the rights of
others serve as compensation for the property taken).
167
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was subject to regulation all along 171 justifying one's conclusion whether a
taking has occurred. It would be difficult to justify noncompensation for
official torts if the existence of implicit in-kind compensation and the existence of extensive regulation were the only factors, because official tort
victims do not receive implicit compensation 172 and because official tort
victims are not forewarned by extensive regulation that their property might
be damaged or destroyed without compensation.
Unlike victims of regulation, however, tort victims are also more likely to
1 73
have suffered injuries that affect their personhood and personal dignity.
Physical injuries inflicted by state officials, unlike devaluation of property
through regulation, implicate the essence of personal sanctity. Indeed, government interference with personal rights and small scale property interests
may be greater threats to personal dignity than interference with investment
property because interference with investment type property is not as likely
to threaten a person's identity or ability to exist as an independent entity.174
3.

Defining Public Use

The takings clause requires compensation when "private property [is]

171 Parties who buy property knowing it is subject to extensive regulation are said
to have "assumed the risk" of further regulation that might diminish the value of the
property. See id. at 154-58 (arguing that notice by the state should mitigate damages,
but not provide an absolute defense, in a takings claim against the state).
172The only compensation that official tort victims receive is the benefit of cheaper
government, because government can operate under a lower standard of care and
save money that would otherwise be spent on damages awards. This is not adequate
implicit compensation because it will exist every time government regulation is
challenged as a taking. Implicit compensation exists only where some benefit unrelated to the saving of government money exists, such as improvement of the environment.
173 See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). Professor
Radin's analysis calls for greater protection of property interests that are closely
linked with personhood and lesser protection of more fungible interests such as
investment property. Id. Although Professor Radin recognizes that accidents will
affect such property, compensation requirements should, as much as possible, attempt to help a person recapture these interests. Professor Baker similarly discusses
personhood and property, but his concern is that protection of personhood interests
would prove detrimental to government's ability to function effectively. See Baker,
Property and Its Relation to ConstitutionallyProtectedLiberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
741, 746 (1986) (arguing that the personhood function of property requires protection
of specifically defined, unique objects or spaces, and implying that this would result
in a more extensive legal support system). Baker thinks that property related to the
exercise of other liberties deserves the most protection. Id. at 775-85.
174 I recognize that the distinction between personhood property and other property is unclear. For example, it is difficult to ascertain whether a five unit apartment
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taken for public use .... ,,175 One could argue that destroyed property is put
to no public use and therefore compensation is not required. This argument
is strange because it converts a provision that appears to protect individuals
from government into a license for government to ignore individual interests
altogether. The public use requirement exists mainly as a limitation on the
appropriate uses of the eminent domain power. 7 6 The public use requirement may thus be used as a defense to a proposed taking; government should
not be able to avoid the compensation requirement by arguing that there is
no public use.
In any event, the government's refusal to compensate parties for destroyed property should be deemed a public use. Such destruction has long
been considered a taking reached by the takings clause. 77 As discussed

building in which the landlord lives is personhood or investment property. Likewise,
the division between the effects of interference with the two sorts of property is not
likely to be perfect. There will also be instances in which people will have their
personal dignity bound up in the future of an investment project. When government
regulation destroys the viability of the project, for example, by zoning a proposed
industrial park for residential use, property owners might perceive the regulation as a
serious intrusion on their personhood. It is also conceivable that injuries will be
compensated in situations where personal dignity is not threatened and when the
injured party's financial resources are only minimally affected.
These criticisms inspire us to consider the inequalities that often occur due to
government regulation and the individualist manner in which we approach questions
regarding property ownership. No regime will be perfect, but as a practical matter,
concentrating on compensation for personal injuries and other property damage in
tort situations is one way to ensure that some important interests are protected.
Another reason for preferring a constitutionally imposed compensation requirement
for torts instead of inverse condemnation and other regulatory takings is that the
group of tort victims is unlikely to be able to organize into an interest group that can
gain protection through the political process. Property developers, by contrast,
should be better able to protect their interests through the political process. In any
event, this ad hoc takings analysis allows the federal courts to take into account all
relevant factors, and the differences in nature between personal and investment
property are important.
175

U.S. CONST. amend, V.

Government may take property only if it intends to put that property to a public
use. Id. This standard is not very difficult to meet. It is similar to the general due
process requirement that regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) ("[T]he
176

Court ...

will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what

constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.' ") (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)).
177 See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 180 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1872) (dam
built by state which resulted in flooding and destruction of plaintiff's property held to
be a taking).
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above, the government chooses its level of care knowing that injuries will
occur in the course of its programs. Government takes the costs of liability
into account when planning programs .178 By immunizing its officials, the
government protects its coffers, thereby advancing the government interest
in official decisionmaking unfettered by fears of liability. In fact, it is hard to
imagine a private purpose for a government decision to deny tort claims
17 9
against government or its officials.
4.

Defining Just Compensation

The takings clause requires that just compensation be paid for property
taken or destroyed by the government. 8 0 Numerous cases address the
adequacy of compensation; the controversies by and large concern methods
of valuation. 8 1 One could argue that "just compensation" means no compensation in tort situations. Living in society entails the risk of suffering
certain noncompensable injuries and compensation for all injuries inflicted
by government is too unrealistic. But even if one accepts this argument in
some situations, the fairness principles underlying the takings clause make it
appropriate to measure the range of noncompensable injuries by the limits of
the generally applicable tort law. 182 Thus, although the state should not be
required to compensate for all injuries, it should compensate for injuries that
83
involve recognized torts.
Damage awards in many federal claims follow traditional tort doctrine.
The Court has consistently held that traditional tort measures apply in § 1983
actions. 84 In a recent § 1983 case, the Court refused to award damages for
"the abstract 'importance' of a constitutional right" separate from any more
traditionally recognized item of damage.18 5 Tort damages should be applied

See supra note 84.
Protecting the public purse from tort claims is obviously a public purpose, and
protecting government officials from damages, while advancing the officials' private
economic interests, also advances the policies underlying official immunities. See
supra note 146 and accompanying text.
180 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1985) (holding that
fair market value, and not replacement cost, is the measure of compensation for
condemned public facility).
182 See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
183 Epstein argues that strict liability should apply against the government for
destruction of private property. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 39-41. This argument is
part of his larger theory that strict liability is morally preferable to a negligence
standard. See id. at 40; Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
184 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1978).
185 See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309-10
(1986); see also Carey, 435 U.S. at 247 (rejecting damages for the abstract value of
178
179
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in takings cases. In takings situations, the aim of the constitutional provision
is to protect property interests from government. Because tort damages are
the device through which property interests are protected generally, it follows that courts should apply traditional tort measures of damages to takings.
This does not mean that there is no room for federal supervision over state
court damages decisions. Federal courts could deem state damage awards
insufficient to satisfy the "just compensation" standard. This reasoning
could apply even in purely private litigation over tortious damage to property. In a private tort case, the due process clause requires that victims have
an opportunity to redress the injury.186 This requirement includes a remedy

due process rights). The Supreme Court in Stachura refused to limit Carey to due
process cases and award damages for the value of first amendment rights. Stachura,
477 U.S. at 309-10.
One problem with the rule denying "abstract" damages is that the threat of a civil
rights action creates no deterrent effect in situations where unlawful conduct is
unlikely to cause damages. The threat of an injunction, which could serve as the basis
for an award in punitive damages cases, is very slight after the Court's decision in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held
that most victims of state torts do not have standing to seek an injunction against
future tortious conduct. The refusal to grant damages for constitutional violations
removes the incentive for victims of many due process violations to sue the official
who violated their rights. For example, a government employee with an employment
property interest who is fired without a hearing may be deemed to not have suffered
any damages if a hearing would have resulted in the firing anyway.
One way to skirt the Supreme Court's refusal to award special damages in such
cases is to allow the federal courts to order state officials to hold hearings that
comport with due process and provide backpay for the period during which the
plaintiff was unemployed prior to the hearing. This order would require notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and an impartial adjudicator. But see Vail v. Board of Educ.,
706 F.2d 1435, 1454 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process
requires only that the body wishing to fire the government employee hear his side of
the case after which it will certainly fire him anyway), aff'd per curiam, 466 U.S. 377
(1984) (equally divided court). The injunction would serve three purposes: first, it
would vindicate the due process interest in a fair hearing; second, it would keep the
federal court out of the state law decision-making process by allowing the state
tribunal to decide whether the planned action, such as firing or suspension from
school, is appropriate; third, it would give parties with no actual damages under a tort
compensation scheme an incentive to vindicate their federal rights-the prospect of
the hearing, backpay, and the attorneys' fees award predicated on the injunction
would make the litigation worthwhile.
186 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) ("the fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard"). Federal law governs, or at least
oversees, many of the procedural aspects of purely private litigation. See, e.g.,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314-18 (1950) (establishing
federal standards for notice).
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that, if awarded, would be adequate to compensate for the loss. 18 7 The
takings clause's "just compensation" requirement merely makes more direct the argument for federal supervision of damages awards. Thus, federal
courts could find a takings clause violation when state courts fail to provide
adequate remedies in government tort cases.
Federal Supervision of State Official Conduct

B.

Doctrinally, uncompensated government torts can be characterized as
takings of private property. But, as previously noted, the Supreme Court has
made two normative arguments against granting state tort victims a federal
cause of action in federal court: in due process cases, the Court refuses to
read the Constitution to address trivial problems;188 and the Court will not
apply the Constitution to displace state tort law with federal standards of
conduct.18 In this subsection, I address these two concerns, and provide a
method for ameliorating or eliminating these concerns altogether.
1. Trivialization of the Constitution and Abuses of Power
At least since Paul v. Davis,1 90 the Court has viewed isolated incidents of
state tortious conduct as insufficiently important to invoke federal protection.1 91 The Court has explained that the Constitution should be concerned
only with abuses of government power by state officials, and not with
conduct by state officials that is wrongful only because it is tortious under
92
state law. 1
Government official torts would not look trivial or unimportant if the
Court focused on the state's refusal to compensate rather than on the

"Although the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the relief
which may have been available if he could have proceeded under § 1983, that does
not mean that the state remedies are not adequate." Parratt,451 U.S. at 544. Parratt
does require, however, that the state remedy must provide the possibility of complete
compensation. Id. ("The remedies provided [by the state] could have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they are
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.").
188 See Daniels V. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (suggesting that finding a due
process deprivation arising out of official's lack of care would trivialize the fourteenth
amendment).
189 See id. (holding that the fourteenth amendment is not a font of tort law to be
superimposed on state tort systems).
190 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
191 See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 327; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
192 Most recently, this view has appeared in the Daniels holding that injuries are
not deprivations within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment because they are
not instances of arbitrary government action or an affirmative abuse of power.
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-33.
187
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official's tortious conduct.' 93 The refusal to compensate is not an isolated

incident of inadvertent official conduct. It is a state policy expressed either
in legislation, the common law, or even the state constitution. 19 Shifting
focus from the tort itself to the refusal to compensate is appropriate because,
in many cases, the taking occurs as the result of that refusal, combined with
the tortious conduct.

195

The Supreme Court should consider state government's refusal to compensate for official torts an abuse of government power for several reasons.
The failure to compensate violates the notions of fairness underlying takings
analysis. 96 It is unfair to force a few private parties to bear the burden of
tortious damages where they are not at fault and where the benefits inure to
the entire community. The whole purpose of the takings clause is to limit
government's ability to unfairly shift the costs of its operation onto a few
private parties. This purpose can be realized only by the socialization of the
cost of torts that .attend the normal operation of government.
Furthermore, not requiring states to compensate their tort victims allows
the states to make general rules for proper conduct and then exempt themselves from the operation of those rules. This is an abuse of government
power in a democratic society premised on limited government and government accountability. 197 Government wields enormous power, and account" In some cases, of course, the tortious conduct itself should also be viewed as an
abuse of government power. For example, the Court should have considered the
defamation in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), an abuse of power because the
officials in that case used the power of their offices improperly. However, in many
cases, such as a simple car accident with a state employee on state business, the
conduct will not appear to be an abuse of power.

I" See Whitman, supra note 41, at 273-74 (arguing that the Court in Daniels and

Davidson overlooked the fundamental question of the state's intentional decision to
deny compensation to the plaintiffs). Whitman argues that the Court's official tort
jurisprudence has suffered because the Court has not examined how the state system
causes and reacts to government torts. Id. at 225-26. Whitman notes that in Parratt,
the Court managed to employ a structural analysis by looking both at the conduct and
at the compensation response of the state. Id. at 265-68. She laments that the "pull of
the individual tort model has proved too strong, leading the Court to retreat from the
structural analysis employed in Parratt." Id. at 226.
"I See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
197 See Murray & Murray, Jr., The Unconstitutionality of Sovereign Immunity in

196

Ohio-Last Standfor the Illegitimate King, 18 TOLEDO L.

REV. 77, 112 (1986) (citing
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291 (1884), for the proposition that sovereign
immunity is incompatible with a democratic government). The Constitution, and
government in the United States generally, is premised on the principle that government authority is founded upon the sovereignty of the people and that the law,
especially the Constitution, binds government as well as the people. Sovereign
immunity, and any special privilege allowing government to exempt itself from the
operation of law, is inconsistent with this theory of government. See infra note 242
and accompanying text.
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ability for injuries can serve as a significant restraint in two separate ways.
First, subjecting government to tort law restrains the government's ability to
exploit its necessary role as judge of its own conduct. Most litigation between government and private parties will take place in the government's
own courts. Holding the government to the same rules and standards for
conduct that it formulates for its citizens will thereby reduce the potential for
arbitrary government action. Second, government will not be as likely to
perpetuate unjust or unwise liability rules if government itself is also subject
to those rules. It is illogical for government to formulate rules that presumably strike the proper policy balance for private parties, parties that may be as
large and complex as state government, and then exempt itself from the
operation of the rules for policy reasons. If government itself cannot live
with the constraints that the liability rules place on it, then perhaps the rules
should be altered. If government can exempt itself from liability rules, there
will be less pressure to change rules that may be unduly oppressive and
unwise.
From the point of view of the government tort victim, the refusal to
compensate constitutes an abuse of power. When injuries occur through no
fault of their own, people expect that the tortfeasor will pay compensation.
Accordingly, if a motorist, for instance, turns out to be uninsured, or if the
tortfeasor's insurance company tries to avoid liability by imposing difficult
claim requirements or by delaying, victims sense that they have been
cheated by the system. When the government is the tortfeasor, the likelihood that the victim will feel cheated by the judicial system increases. First,
the victim will view government as an incredibly powerful organization, with
a large capacity to do damage and a staggering potential for bureaucratic
delay and avoidance. Moreover, victims may consider the government's
refusal to pay as a betrayal of the ideal of government by law.'"8 Victims will
perceive that the government has put itself above the law and the reasons
may appear more mean-spirited than the policy justifications given for the
immunity. Victims will feel wronged because their government has failed to
respect their personal integrity.1 99

The Supreme Court has very recently recognized that because defenses unique to
government defendants effectively discriminate against parties with federal claims
against state officials, they may be inconsistent with § 1983. See Felder v. Casey, 56
U.S.L.W. 4689, 4693 (U.S. June 22, 1988). In that case, the Court held that a state
notice of claim statute, which required parties with claims against the state to notify
the state of the claim within six months of when the claim arose, did not apply to a
§ 1983 action brought in state court. This case was decided too close to the time that
this article went to press to allow for extensive analysis.
198See supra note 197.
199 When rights are not respected, "the dignity of th., individual is diminished and
people are less able to achieve their goals. People feel insecure and they lose
self-respect .... When denial of rights occurs systematically over time, the result is
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With all these considerations in mind, it is difficult to view protection of
victims of torts inflicted by government officials as anything approaching
"trivial." At stake are policies ranging from the desirability of protecting
individuals from governmental misconduct to the fundamental belief that
people in a free country should have faith in their government and in the
propriety of official conduct. Extending takings clause protection to government torts would therefore not lead to trivialization of the Constitution.
2.

Federalization of State Tort Law

The Supreme Court's second normative argument is that if the fourteenth
amendment is read to grant a cause of action in favor of official tort victims,
the amendment will become a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States." 200 In some
areas, most notably the law of defamation, whole areas of state law have
become constitutionalized.2 0 1 The question here is whether all of tort law in
official tort cases would become federalized if the Court required states to
compensate their tort victims.
The fear that the fourteenth amendment might displace state tort law is
groundless. 02 The only federal issue in most cases would be whether the

alienation, isolation, anger, and fear. In extreme cases, the result is totalitarianism or
chaos." Ziegler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 679-80 (1987) (footnotes omit-

ted).
200

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (deciding scope of
publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen).
202 The Supreme Court may be concerned less with federalization of state tort law
than with the federal court caseload. Some perceive that the federal courts are
overworked and that a primary cause of overload is frivolous § 1983 cases brought to
redress tortious injuries. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 186-87 (1985) (suggesting that the fear that motivated federal jurisdiction
over § 1983-that southern states would convict blacks for crimes they did not
commit-is no longer applicable to modern southern courts). A recent study suggests
that § 1983 cases have not contributed to the increased caseload more than other
areas of federal jurisdiction. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 23, at 693-95.
Another doctrinal area in which district court caseload concerns may be a motivating factor is the recent development of eleventh amendment jurisprudence. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Court held that
the eleventh amendment prevents the federal courts from issuing injunctions against
state agencies to force the agencies to follow state law. This may force cases into
state court. Cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980) (holding that the eleventh
amendment has no application in state court and that state court may award damages
against the state in claim based on federal law). The potential intrusion on state
201

sovereignty seems greater in Thiboutot than in Pennhurst. In Thiboutot, federal law
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state may treat victims of government inflicted torts differently from victims
of private torts. This issue neither implicates the whole of state tort law nor
does it present the possibility that federal law will displace state standards of
liability generally.
Daniels v.Williams203 provides a helpful example as to how state tort law
would exist alongside the federal takings regime. In Daniels, a prison employee negligently left a pillow on a prison stairway and a prisoner was
injured when he slipped on the pillow. Suppose that in a similar situation-a
pillow left on the stairway by a hotel employee-the hotel owner and the
individual employee would be liable for the injuries. Assume also that under
state tort law there is a defense of contributory negligence. In deciding
whether the prisoner stated a federal claim, the federal court could not
disregard the state tort rules such as the liability rule or the contributory
negligence defense because those rules delineate the protected interest at
stake. If, under state law, the prisoner were guilty of contributory negligence, there would be no takings problem if the state did not provide
compensation. However, if the state's refusal to compensate were based on
an immunity enjoyed by the prison system or its employee, then the takings
clause would be violated by the failure to compensate. The federal court
would not overrule the state's choice of contributory negligence versus
comparative negligence or any other state tort law doctrine.
Of course, if official tort cases were routinely heard in federal court, there
is some chance that once the federal courts assume jurisdiction over cases,
federal standards of conduct will inevitably develop. 04 If federal courts hear
only cases involving official misconduct, federal courts could distinguish
state tort rules based on the 'official nature of the § 1983 cases, resulting in a
federal common law of state official liability. Thus the federal courts, to
preserve the proper boundaries of federal-state power, would have to be
careful not to replace state tort law with federal norms. While this sort of
development theoretically could pose a substantial threat to state authority
over official torts, experience with fairly extensive federal involvement in
state tort administration in diversity cases shows that the injection of federal
20 5
norms can be checked.

negated the state's decision, but in Pennhurst the federal courts were only forcing
state officials to follow the commands of their own government. This suggests that
district court jurisdiction may sometimes be more important than principles of
federalism.
203 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
204 See Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1523 (1987) (arguing that federal courts are likely to
misconstrue state law).
205 Replacement of state tort law with federal starJards may happen to some
extent in the government employee due process cases. Where local law limits the
discretion of the employing agency to fire the employee, a state or local government
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There are many areas in which federal courts adjudicate state law issues
without any apparent injection of federal values. The most immediate federal
involvement in state law is in diversity cases and in cases involving pendent
state law claims. Federal courts hear and decide a variety of state law issues
in these contexts and there is no indication that Erie's promise of state
positive law authority has not been realized. 20 6 These cases present less of a
problem than official torts because they involve only federal jurisdiction, and
not substantive issues. Yet, federal due process standards apply in all cases
adjudicating state tort and contract law between private parties, and there is
no evidence that federal substantive norms have encroached on state authority in these cases.

207

employee is entitled to a hearing before being discharged. The most common form of
this protection is the "for cause" limitation on firing most civil service employees.
The Supreme Court has not, however, limited the reach of this doctrine to cases in
which employees have an explicit contractual or statutory right to tenure. See Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, the Court held that informal understandings, generated for example by a longstanding practice of discharge only for
cause, are sufficient to create a constitutionally protected interest in employment
which may be terminated only for cause and even then only after a hearing. Id. at
599-603. The Court in Perry referred to state law of implied contract as the source of
the "legitimate expectation" of continued employment, id. at 601-02; but it is uncertain whether state contract law would actually recognize Perry's claim. Had the
federal court disregarded state contract law and imposed its own implied contract
norms in the name of procedural due process, it would make the federal court a font
of common law, regulating state and local employment practices in ways contrary to
the state's desire. The potential for this sort of federal activity should not doom from
the outset the possibility of federal supervision of state compensation practices;
rather it should merely point out that the federal courts must be sensitive to the role
that state law plays in the area.
206 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
207 In any litigation between private parties, if state law recognizes a cause of
action, federal law establishes the minimum procedural opportunity the state must
grant the parties to present their cases. The best example of this sort of federal
supervision is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In
Mullane, New York law granted beneficiaries of certain trusts a cause of action to
challenge the accounting of the trustee. The state statute allowed notice of the
settlement of the account to be by publication only, despite the fact that the trustee
had the names and addresses of the beneficiaries. By settling the account, the trustee
could cut off negligence and other claims against the trustee. The Supreme Court held
that the cause of action was property and that notice by publication did not satisfy
due process because it was not "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314. Nothing in Mullane suggests that
federal law tinkered with the elements of the claim against the trustee. Federal law
can speak to the federal issues in a case without disturbing the state law aspects of the
litigation. Mullane was reaffirmed recently in Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v.
Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988).
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In refuting the argument that federal norms would replace state liability
rules, I do not mean to argue that there is no room for purely federal law
regarding official conduct. Federal law governs whether a state official has
violated a more specific clause of the Constitution, such as the fourth
amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. Further,
while a determination whether a "taking of property" has occurred depends
on whether state law has created a protected interest, substantive due
process may protect interests from state deprivation that are not protected
by state law. For example, assume state law allowed private parties and
state officers to use deadly force against fleeing felons without considering
whether the felons posed a danger to the community. An injured fleeing felon
could not establish a takings claim, because no state liability rule protected
the fleeing felon. But a federal court could find, under the relevant level of
scrutiny, that the state rule violated substantive due process.
There is one last method of understanding the Supreme Court's fear that
the Constitution would become a font of tort law. The Court might not be
worried at all about federalization of state substantive law in the terms set
forth above; instead, it may be concerned solely with striking a proper
balance in the caseload distribution between the state and federal courts.
The Court may simply think that the state tort law issues that would necessarily arise in official tort cases should not be litigated in the federal
2
courts . 08

This objection, however, can be easily met. It might be appropriate to
leave primary enforcement of the states' obligation under the takings clause
to compensate tort victims to the states themselves. In the next section, I
-describe a system of exhaustion of state remedies in official tort cases which
will leave for federal courts only those cases in which the state refuses to
waive its immunity, or cases in which there is reason to believe that the
victim has not received a fair hearing. Specifically, I argue that no taking
arises until after the state courts refuse to grant compensation. Thus, federal
supervision would be necessary only after state tribunals have had an opportunity to redress the state injuries, and state tort law would not be litigated in
federal court.
III.

ENFORCING THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AGAINST STATES AND STATE
OFFICIALS

Having laid out the groundwork for a federal cause of action for government torts, I now turn to the topic of enforcing the requirement that states
compensate their tort victims. In this section I focus on the distribution of
208 As a normative matter, though, the federal courts would be much more receptive to official tort claims if they would treat the refusal to compensate, rather than
the tort itself, as the cause for federal concern. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over official tort cases between state and federal courts. I assume that federal law-that is, the takings clause-requires states to pay
damages to their tort victims whenever similar conduct would give rise to
damages liability in litigation between private parties.
Enforcement of federal law at the state level necessarily implicates
federalism concerns. Having discussed the effects of federalism analysis on
the recognition of substantive rights, 20 9 1 now discuss how federalism affects
the procedural rules necessary to implement the takings analysis at the state
and federal level.
Although cases sometimes recognize that federalism entails federal supervision of state compliance with the Constitution,2 10 federalism concerns are
often raised to close the federal courts to constitutional claims against state
officials. 211 This article works from the contrary position that federalism
provides for enforcement of federal law against the states, and not federal
deference to state decisions. Yet, even under this less deferential interpretation of federalism doctrine, the proposals outlined in this section provide for
only minimal federal intervention into state processes. State tort law under
the takings analysis would remain relatively free from federal supervision.
A.

Jurisdiction Over Official Tort Cases

There are three possible jurisdictions over official tort cases. The cases
could be heard in state court2 12 (with federal review in the United States
Supreme Court); in federal court without first going to state court; or in state
court first, with review commencing in the federal district court after state
remedies have been exhausted. In takings cases, the exhaustion model is the
best alternative because it preserves the appropriate balance between federal and state power. Also, the takings clause requires some resort to state

See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
211 See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425-26 (1987)
(characterizing the doctrines of sovereignty and federalism as an aegis protecting
goyernment from liability arising out of its own lawlessness). This holds true in
eleventh amendment cases, see, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-103 (1984) (holding that the eleventh amendment jurisprudence
is driven by federalism concerns), in abstention cases, see, e.g., Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (holding that principles of "Our Federalism" preclude exercise of
federal injunction against ongoing state criminal prosecution), and cases involving
preclusion rules, see, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 80-85 (1984) (holding that federal court must apply state preclusion rules to
determine preclusive effect of state court judgment).
212 *'State court" here refers to whatever tribunal the state designates. If the state
established an administrative body for official tort cases, any such administrative
remedy would be subject to federal due process standards.
209
210
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remedies because takings claims are not ripe until state procedures for
2 13
seeking compensation have proven fruitless.
Under the exhaustion model, the state courts determine whether the
defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries under state law, then the federal
courts apply federal takings norms to the state decision. Victims of official
torts should first sue in state court. If plaintiffs lose their cases in state court,
they should then be allowed to sue in federal court. Federal claims would be
meritorious only if plaintiffs were denied relief by the state court because of
some privilege or immunity that the defendant had by virtue of the defendant's status as a government official or agency. 21 4 If the federal court were
convinced that the state tort victim lost the case in state court because of a
generally applicable limitation to liability, the federal court should dismiss
the case; the federal court, however, would ensure that the plaintiff's federal
21 5
right to compensation is respected.

213 In regulatory takings cases, the Supreme Court requires some resort to state
tribunals before federal takings claims may be brought in. federal court, but it is
unclear what state remedies must be exhausted. See Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-94 (1985) (holding that
regulatory takings claim not ripe until administrative remedies for zoning variance
are exhausted); id. at 194-97 (holding that takings claim not ripe until state procedures
for seeking just compensation are exhausted); see also MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that takings claim not ripe for
first reason in Hamilton Bank).
The Supreme Court has analogized official tort due process cases to takings cases,
writing:
[T]he State's action is not "complete" in the sense of causing a Constitutional
injury "unless or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation

remedy for the property loss."

. .

. Likewise, because the Constitution does not

require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State's
action [in an inverse condemnation case] is not "complete" until the State fails
to provide adequate compensation for the taking.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 195 (citation and footnote omitted).
214 Once it were established that states must compensate their tort victims, states
would presumably follow the law and prohibit immunities from barring recovery.
However, federal review would still be desirable to ensure that the state followed the
law, and also to ensure that the damages met the just compensation standard.
215 Federal review of state adherence to the Constitution in criminal cases increases the level of adherence to the constitutional values at stake. Cf. Resnik, Tiers,
57 So. CAL. L. REV. 837, 869-70 (1984) (arguing that in ajudicial model in which one
court reviews the decisions of the other, the forum under review, if it works "consistently, rationally, and impartially," will enhance norm enforcement). Having a federal district court forum for federal claims generally increases uniformity and accuracy because federal judges tend to be more expert in federal law than state judges.
L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

95 (1981). Yackle also notes that federal

judges tend to be more independent than state judges and thus are better able to act in
favor of federal rights when it would be unpopular to do so. Id.
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The exhaustion model is preferable to an unlimited right to sue in federal
court for a number of reasons grounded in federalism concerns. By allowing
the state courts to decide the state tort law aspects of the takings cases, the
exhaustion model eliminates the Supreme Court's objection that federalizing
the law of official torts will wrest control of state tort law from the states.
Similarly, the federal courts will be less likely to make mistakes concerning
state law. State courts would thereby be allowed to develop their own tort
law norms. Finally, pressure on the federal docket is relieved, for when the
21 6
plaintiff in state court is successful, no federal claim will be brought.
An exhaustion requirement has distinct advantages over a system in which
cases are directed to either the state or the federal system. Beyond gaining
control over their general tort policy, states are encouraged by the exhaustion model to solve the official tort problem themselves. States know that if
they incorporate federal norms into their law, their system will function
relatively free from federal review;" 7 they can do so in this situation by
216 An exhaustion requirement for takings cases is consistent with Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). In Patsy, the Court held that § 1983 plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust state remedies before bringing suit in federal court. Id. This
holding does not speak to whether a constitutional provision, such as the takings
clause, may require exhaustion of state remedies before a violation can be established.
The principles underlying Patsy do not act as a bar to the exhaustion model in
takings cases because the alternative to exhaustion in takings cases is probably no
federal suit at all. If an immediate federal court suit were the alternative to an
exhaustion model, it would share some of the problems inherent in federal defense
removal in state criminal cases in which the defendant has a federal defense. Professor Yackle has explained that in criminal cases, the exhaustion model is appropriate
because it ensures a federal forum without completely displacing state authority and
because it avoids the centralization that would occur if federal defense removal were

allowed. See Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1019,

1034-40 (1985) ("[Habeas] ensures the availability of trial-level federal forum to
litigants whose federal claims arise initially as defenses to state criminal prosecutions."). Patsy could reduce the chances of a litigant getting into a federal forum
because, if the Patsy holding is applied rigidly to forbid exhaustion whenever there is
a federal claim, the Court may be so reluctant to open the federal district court to an
immediate action that it will refrain from recognizing the federal claim at all.
217 Professor Althouse explains that states should be free from federal intervention
only when they have an "effectively functioning" system for recognizing a federal
right or at least are -attempting to find in their own law alternative solutions to the
problems addressed by federal law." Althouse, supra note 204, at 1489. The analysis
depends on the notion that states are an important part of our federal system, and
therefore there is a federal interest in fostering responsibility and independence in
state administration. Id. Federal review, after exhaustion of state remedies, is still
necessary to ensure that federal rights are respected. See id. at 1504-08 (arguing that
deference to the states should be overcome by the interest in the integrity of federal
law).
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abandoning official and sovereign immunities and allowing compensation for
official tort victims under ordinary tort rules. Entrusting this responsibility
to the states can thus have the positive effect of making the states more
2 8
independent. 1
Within the exhaustion model, it is possible to design a system in which the
federal courts only rarely adjudicate issues of state tort law in official tort
cases. Once the takings rules were established, there would be few occasions in which federal intervention would be necessary. If, however, the
plaintiff makes out a federal takings case on the grounds that the defendant
asserted an immunity in state court, the federal court could compel the
defendant, through an injunction, to waive the immunity, and send the
parties back to state court. 219 This process of going back and forth between
the two court systems is obviously costly and cumbersome, but if the Court
wants to avoid federal decisionmaking on state tort law, it can be done
without abandoning the federal rights of the official tort victim.
Judging from the number of § 1983 official tort suits brought directly in the
federal courts, 220 official tort victims seem to prefer bringing their suits
originally in the federal district court, bypassing state court altogether.
Bypassing state court is less expensive for the plaintiff forced to bring a first
suit in state court then a second in federal court; it can also allow the plaintiff
the advantage of fact finding and application of state tort norms in what
might be a more sympathetic forum. 22 1 I do not mean my discussion of the
Althouse argues that federal review is necessary to preserve state autonomy
over state law: if state courts make erroneous decisions of federal law, federal review
can free the state courts from such an erroneous view, and thereby empower the
states to pursue a different course under state law. Id. at 1510.
219 This could also reduce federal-state friction in some due process cases. In a due
process employment case where the plaintiff complains of being fired without a prior
hearing, a federal court could issue an injunction requiring a hearing, along with
reinstatement and back pay for the period during which the employee was out of
work, leaving it to the state system to determine whether the firing was proper under
the state law that granted the plaintiff a property interest in continued employment.
Only if the state system refused, after the injunction, to provide a constitutionally
adequate hearing, would a federal court be forced to hear the merits of the state law
dispute. Reinstatement and backpay are necessary to give employees an incentive to
2I

bring the case to federal court and to give employers an incentive to grant the
pretermination hearings that are constitutionally required.
2"2 See 1986 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 179.
221 See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1977) (noting

that historically, litigants looking for expansive and vigorous application of constitutional rights have sought federal forums, while their opponents have sought state
forums). Some scholars have noted that federal judges may tend to approach their
jobs with a mindset toward protecting federal rights, while state judges may be more
concerned with advancing state legal goals. Id. at 1124-27; accord L.
note 215, at 99.

YACKLE,

supra
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exhaustion model to denigrate the importance of allowing plaintiffs with
federal claims to bring those claims directly to federal court. But given the
Supreme Court's unanimous resolve2 2 to direct official tort cases to state
court, and the Court's ripeness doctrine in takings cases, 2 the exhaustion
is more effective than an appeal to
model can preserve federal review22that
4
Court.
Supreme
the United States
The notion that an exhaustion model might further important federalism
225
policies has been raised many times, mostly in the habeas corpus context.
Habeas is the most well-established regime in which state remedies are
exhausted before a federal issue may be brought to federal district court. In
habeas corpus, state criminal defendants must raise their federal defenses in
state cour., 2 6 After the defendant has exhausted all available state remedies,
in federal district court and relitigate the
the defendant may bring a petition
227
defendant's federal claims.
If one believes that criminal defendants with federal defenses should have
a federal forum in which to present their defenses, one could imagine a
system in which such defendants could remove their cases for trial to federal
district court. The disruption of the state system that would occur under this
system is a good reason for disallowing federal defense removal in criminal

222 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Court unanimously recognizing
that adequate state remedies bar due process claim even when alleged tortious
behavior is intentional).
223 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
224 Professor Yackle has argued that direct review by the Supreme Court is an
inadequate federal forum for litigants. This inadequacy is created, Yackle suggests,
because the Court realistically cannot hear all the claims brought before it, and
consequently must select cases on criteria other than the effects of its decision on the
litigants. Yackle, supra note 216, at 1022 n. 137. The Supreme Court itself has noted
that Supreme Court review "is an inadequate substitute for the initial District Court
determination .... " England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
225 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973) ("The rule of exhaustion in
federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in consideration of federal-state comity.");
Yackle, supra note 216, at 1019-40 (suggesting an alternate view of habeas as a
method for providing a federal forum for federal rights that are unpopular at the state
level, and thereby regarding habeas as an exhaustion model of review); id. at 1050
("Indeed, my alternative explanation for postconviction habeas essentially collapses
into the exhaustion doctrine.").
22.See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (holding that habeas petitioners must
exhaust all claims at the state level before a federal court will hear the petition).
227 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). The system of federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions is extremely complicated. The generalizations in the text are
subject to numerous qualifications which are beyond the scope of this article. For a
general description and analysis of federal review of state criminal convictions, see
L. YACKLE, supra note 215.
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cases; but those reasons do not undercut the necessity of an opportunity to
eventually litigate in a federal forum. 2 8
The habeas corpus system is an exception to general rules which preclude
relitigation in federal court of issues already decided in state court. 22 9 Relitigation is allowed in habeas corpus because it is believed to contribute
23 0
The
positively to effective federal-state cooperation in criminal justice.
relationship between the federal and state court systems might be enhanced
by the creation of what has been termed a dialogue between the two systems. 23 1 The two systems, by focusing on each other's performance in the
and
same case, will engage in dialogue about the proper interpretation
232
importance of the elements of their respective decisions.
In government tort cases, federal court misinterpretations of state tort law
and state misconceptions about federal constitutional norms can be corrected through the exhaustion model. Each system will become better at
Commonly noted reasons against federal defense removal in criminal cases are
that the federal courts would be flooded with cases, and state authority over its
criminal law would be eroded. Professor Yackle adds that a centralized system of
criminal justice presents a greater danger of repression than the decentralized multistate system of state criminal prosecutions. See Yackle, supra note 216, at 1034-40.
Yackle's analysis complements Rapaczynski's normative analysis in favor of decentralization of political processes in the commerce clause context. Rapaczynski notes
that the existence of smaller political units facilitates political organization of groups
that might be at a disadvantage on the national level. See Rapaczynski, supra note 8.
But see Tushnet, supra note 16, at 991-93 (doubting that local governments are much
more accessible than the national government).
229 "Not every would-be litigant is entitled to relitigation. The subject matter
jurisdiction of the habeas courts is limited explicitly to petitions from applicants who
allege they are in 'custody' in violation of federal law." Yackle, supra note 216, at
998-99.
230 Although there are important differences between the habeas corpus system
and federal review of state tort claims for takings clause violations, there are also
significant similarities. Most notably, both problems involve direct federal court
supervision of the working of state government, usually the state courts. In both
situations, the importance of an effective forum for airing the federal issues must be
analyzed in light of the reasons for entrusting certain functions to the states. By
contrast, many areas of federal jurisdiction do not necessarily involve direct supervision of state courts. Examples include federal crimes and federal labor law.
231 See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048-50 (1977) (outlining the contours of a model of
federal-state interaction based on a dialogue between federal and state courts).
232 Federal and state courts could learn from each other by reading each other's
opinions in different cases, but that would not be as direct a dialogue as forcing
review of the same case. If both federal and state courts looked at the same case,
each system would need to evaluate the other's position directly because there would
be no basis for distinguishing on the facts between the federal and state cases. The
federal court could thereby gain an appreciation of state tort principles and the state
court could learn about federal constitutional norms.
228
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performing its function in the federal system; the states will administer tort
law with increased sensitivity to federal rights, and the federal courts will
have the benefit of authoritative state tort decisions to monitor for compliance with federal takings norms.
Problems with Relitigation of Official Tort Cases in Federal Court

B.

Using the exhaustion model in official tort cases would be a departure
from current law, and there are questions about whether it is consistent with
important features of the American legal system. In this subsection, I address eleventh amendment problems with federal court jurisdiction-at any
stage-over actions against states and state officials. I also consider problems specific to the exhaustion model, namely structural limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, preclusion, and abstention.
1. The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment 233 presents the most serious threat to any federal
court suit against states and state officials, 34 for it has long been interpreted
to require the federal courts to respect state sovereign immunity in federal
court actions.23 5 Of course, state courts would still be required to apply

The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
233

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
234 For eleventh amendment purposes, it is important to distinguish between local
government and state government. The amendment does not bar damages actions in
federal court against local government units such as cities and counties; it does bar
actions against states themselves and units of state government, such as administrative agencies. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 &
n.55 (1978) (holding that municipalities could be sued under § 1983 notwithstanding
the eleventh amendment); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding
that the eleventh amendment bars suits against states, but not counties). Even under
current applications of the eleventh amendment, then, the exhaustion model could be
implemented in official tort cases involving local governments and officials.
235 Although the eleventh amendment forbids federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State," U.S. CONST. amend. XI, the Supreme

Court has long interpreted the amendment to signify the framers' intent to grant
complete immunity to the states from suits brought even by their own citizens in
federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985)
(reaffirming the holding in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), that the eleventh
amendment "barred a citizen from bringing suits against his own State in federal
court .... "). This interpretation appears to have very little basis in history and even
less in text. See id. at 258-90 & n. 11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the history
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federal takings standards, because the eleventh amendment does not apply
to cases brought in state courts.23 6 Also, even if federal district court jurisdiction were barred by the eleventh amendment, the Supreme Court could
still hear appeals from state supreme court decisions.2 37 The Supreme Court
arguably could order states to hear takings cases against the states, to hear
cases against state officials based on federal law, and to award damages
sufficient to satisfy takings clause requirements; but it is questionable that
such an order would pass eleventh amendment muster, especially if issued
by a federal district court.
Allowing federal district court jurisdiction over suits for damages paid out
of the state treasury, or suits for an injunction ordering the state court to
award compensation to tort victims,

238

would require a reinterpretation of

the eleventh amendment. There is, however, persuasive historical and textual evidence that the eleventh amendment should not bar federal question
suits against states in federal courts. 239 If the Court were to adopt this

of the eleventh amendment has been misconstrued, and that there is "no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated policy
of excluding suits against States from federal court."); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.

1033 (1983) (arguing that the adopters of the eleventh amendment did not
specifically intend to forbid the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over private
suits against the states); see generally L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 129-41 (1986). Recently, the Court has
intimated that some suits against state officials in their official capacity are also
barred by the eleventh amendment:
[I]t is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her personal capacity
cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the governmental entity. A victory
in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather
than against the entity that employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action
is asserted against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a personalcapacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985). It is unclear whether the Graham
holding will affect suits for damages against individual state official tortfeasors. But
cf. Will v. Michigan Dep't of Civil Serv., 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987)
(holding that state official and state not "persons" under § 1983, thus immunizing
them from § 1983 action in state court), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988)
236 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 & n.7 (1980).
237 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-23 (1821) (holding that the
Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to hear appeals of state supreme court decisions).
238 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that eleventh amendment
barred federal district court from ordering state officials to send to class action
plaintiffs notice that they had been denied public assistance, and that they could
request a hearing on such denial).
239 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, recently
endorsed a view of the eleventh amendment that challenges conventional wisdom.
REV.
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position, the eleventh amendment would no longer provide an impediment to
hearing government tort actions based on the takings clause in federal court.
Another way around the eleventh amendment bar involves considering the
text and history of the takings clause itself. The Court has recently acknowledged that the takings clause requires a damages remedy and overrides
sovereign immunity to the extent such immunities bar compensation for
takings.2 40 Because the Court repeatedly has held that the eleventh amend-

See Welch v. State Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958-70
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
247-304 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also recently expressed doubt
as to the correctness of the Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence. See Welch,
107 S. Ct. at 2957-58 (suggesting that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), was
decided incorrectly).
In Atascadero, Justice Brennan argued that while the eleventh amendment obviously was intended to overrule Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)
(sustaining a state law contract claim brought in federal court against a state by a
nonresident plaintiff), it was to do so simply by preventing diversity of citizenship
from being used as the sole basis for the federal courts' jurisdiction in such suits.
According to Justice Brennan's theory, then, claims brought under federal law
against states would be permitted under Article III's grant of federal jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the eleventh amendment; only state law claims based solely on
diversity would be barred.
Not only is this view supported by historical evidence, see generally Fletcher,
supra note 235, but, as Justice Brennan suggests, it is more faithful to the text of the
amendment:
Those who have argued that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to constitutionalize a broad principle of state sovereign immunity have always elided
the question of why Congress would have chosen the language of the Amendment as enacted to state such a broad principle.
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's
interpretation of the eleventh amendment would also obviate some of the Court's
more tortured readings of the amendment's text, such as Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890), in which the Court interpreted the amendment's bar of suits against a state
"by citizens of another state" to include citizens suing their own states.
For a general exploration of eleventh amendment doctrine in a historical context,
see Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977); Fletcher, supra note 235. For a discussion of the
importance of federal forum availability for the vindication of federal rights, see
LeClerq, State Immunity and Federal Judicial Power-Retreat from National
Supremacy, 27 FLA. L. REV. 361 (1975); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment, an
EndangeredSpecies, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1988). Akhil Amar has recently echoed these
themes, calling the Court's jurisprudence in the areas of state sovereign immunity
and the eleventh amendment "nonsense." Amar, supra note 211, at 1473.
240 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2386 n.9 (1987) ("[T]he Constitution ... dictates [a damages] remedy for
interference with property rights amounting to a taking.").
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ment bar is based on principles of sovereign immunity 2 4 1 and because the
takings clause has been held to limit such immunities, the eleventh amendment should not limit federal district court jurisdiction over takings claims.
Even if the Court refuses to adopt such an analysis, this analysis serves as a
reminder to the Court that it is illogical to maintain sovereign immunity in a
242
government limited by a Constitution and notions of popular sovereignty.
Finally, the federalism concerns that motivate recognition of state
sovereign immunity should not shield the state system so that it can violate
federal law. The states may have a legitimate claim to some autonomy over

241 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1890) (arguing from Hamilton's
position in Federalist 81 that state sovereignty is the basis of the eleventh amendment).
242 Akhil Amar has argued persuasively that state sovereign immunity is inconsistent with popular sovereignty and constitutional government, Amar, supra note 211,
at 1466-92. Amar argues that popular sovereignty and constitutional government
mean that victims of unconstitutional conduct must have an avenue for relief, either
from the offending official or from the government itself. See id. at 1491. Amar argues
from historical evidence that the framers intended for states to have no immunity
from constitutional claims. Id. at 1444-51. He also argues that features of the Constitution (and its ratifying process) place the people of the United States sovereign
over the state governments and place federal law, especially federal constitutional
law, supreme over state law. In addition to the Supremacy Clause, Amar cites the
facts that the Constitution was ratified in conventions of the people, not by the state
governments, id. at 1458-60, and that the Constitution allows for binding amendments
even without unanimity, as evidence that the states are not sovereign under the
Constitution. Id. at 1464.
Amar would confine the eleventh amendment to its most obvious application,
overruling the Court's conclusion in Chisolm v. Georgia that states can be sued by
citizens of other states raising common law claims in the federal courts. 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793). Amar argues that the Court's mistake in Chisolm was its failure to
apply state common law, which would have barred the claim under common law
rules of sovereign immunity. Amar points out that this error would not be made today
because of the rule in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) requiring federal
courts to apply state law in most common law cases in the federal courts. See Amar,
supra note 211, at 1469-70.
Amar's approach is overly simplistic. Similar theoretical problems regarding the
legitimacy of government action arise when the state claims immunity under its own
laws. Determining in which instances the state is sufficiently different from private
parties so that it can exempt itself from the operation of law is not easy. Indeed, all
breach of contract cases against states can be transformed into constitutional claims
under the Contract Clause, e.g. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and all tort
cases, if compensation is refused, are colorable takings clause violations. Consequently, it would be difficult to see when the states' common law immunity would
actually operate. The question returns to the problems discussed above regarding
whether the states' immunities limit the interests protected by the Constitution.
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state law, and preservation of a well functioning state system might point
toward jurisdictional allocations that minimize the potential for federal intervention; but at bottom, the states have no legitimate interest in avoiding
federal constitutional constraints.143 The states are not sovereign. They are
units in a system of cooperative sovereignty in which minimization of needless friction and interference is all that can be expected.
2. Structural Limitations on Relitigation in the Federal Courts
(a) Rooker-Feldman. Only rarely do disappointed state court litigants get
a second chance to bring their claims to federal court. 244 The Supreme Court
has ruled that federal district courts have no jurisdiction to review "final
state-court judgments. ' 2 45 Even in situations where general grants of jurisdiction could be interpreted to grant district court jurisdiction to review state
court decisions, the Supreme Court has constructed doctrines to bar such
cases from the federal district courts.2 46 This doctrine prohibiting federal
district court review of final state court adjudications has become known as
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Althouse, supra note 204, at 1504-08.
The most notable example of relitigation, as discussed above, is habeas corpus.
In criminal cases, a state defendant, after exhausting state remedies, is allowed to
relitigate some federal issues in federal court by way of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982).
245 The lower federal courts are not constituted as courts of appeal above the state
system; only the Supreme Court has such jurisdiction. District of Columbia Court of
Appeal v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415-16 (1923). See supra notes 225-232 & 244 and accompanying text.
246 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. In Feldman, the plaintiff's district court suit challenged the District of Columbia local court's refusal to grant him a waiver from its
requirement that applicants to the District bar attend a law school approved by the
American Bar Association. The Court distinguished between challenges to the state
court's rule, which could be brought in federal district court, and challenges to
particular decisions regarding eligibility, which could not. Id. at 485; e.g., Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) (allowing federal
court challenge to rules regulating lawyers issued by state supreme court).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine appeared again recently in the Second Circuit's
decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.
Ct. 1519 (1987). The Supreme Court noted the Second Circuit's reliance on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Pennzoil Co., 107 S.Ct. at 1524, but did not itself rely on
it. Only Justice Marshall relied on the doctrine in his concurrence, and four other
concurring opinions expressly disclaimed reliance on it. See id. at 1533 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1529-30 (Scalia, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 1531 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 1534-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1536 n.3
(Stevens, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
243
244
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The most obvious reason underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would
seem to be res judicata. If the state court judgment were truly final, in that it
precluded further litigation, then rules of claim preclusion should bar a
second suit arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. The Supreme
Court, however, has extended its reasoning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
beyond preclusion rules, which may vary from state to state;2 47 instead, the
Court has held that the district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
4
actions that are in the nature of appeals from state court judgments.
In the state tort context, Rooker-Feldman could eliminate any possible
subsequent federal district court action unless the state court refused to hear
the claim at all. One could argue that any constitutional challenge to the
state's refusal to hear the claim would be like an appeal of the state court's
judgment and therefore must be brought to the Supreme Court on appeal. If
this argument were true, it would create a Catch-22 out of the Supreme
Court's ripeness decisions in the takings area. 49 Under ripeness rules, a
takings claim is not ripe until state remedies are exhausted; but once such
remedies are exhausted, Rooker-Feldman could be interpreted to eliminate
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Court's ripeness doctrine
would effectively and permanently deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction. To avoid this Catch-22, the Court should view the takings claim in
federal court as a new claim for ripeness purposes. Exhaustion of state
remedies would be prerequisite to bringing a takings claim in federal court.
Because the takings claim would address the question of the state's failure to
compensate, and not the merits of the underlying claim, it would not be
precluded by either res judicata or Rooker-Feldman principles.
In any event, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not bar the Supreme
Court from constructing an exhaustion system because it is inconsistent with
federal preclusion principles. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself is inconsistent with federal preclusion principles and should be abandoned. If the
state court judgment, under state preclusion rules, would not bar the subsequent federal action, then federal courts cannot apply the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to bar the case without violating the Supreme Court's rule that
federal courts may not give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than would the courts of the rendering state. 250 The Rooker-Feldman

Federal courts must apply the rendering state's law to determine the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
465 U.S. 75, 80-85 (1984) (holding that petitioner's state court judgment has same
claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the state
courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (federal Full Faith and Credit statute).
248 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 (holding that only United States Supreme Court
can review state court judgments).
241 See supra note 213.
2"0 Migra, 465 U.S. at 85; id. at 88 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued
in Feldman that the appropriate inquiry into the preclusive effect of state judgments
247
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doctrine is of dubious pedigree; any valid interests that it advances, such as
finality or proper relations between the federal and state court systems, are
already addressed through preclusion rules. Applying Rooker-Feldman to
bar cases that would not be barred under preclusion rules would violate state
251
autonomy over the preclusive effect of state judgments.
(b) Preclusion Rules. Because the exhaustion model allows a new action
in federal court after an action has already been adjudicated in state court, it
is necessary to ask whether preclusion rules would bar the federal action.
Generally, principles of preclusion bar relitigation both of issues actually
litigated in an earlier action, 252 and issues that could have been raised (but
were not) in the earlier action. 253 To preserve state autonomy over preclusion law, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Full Faith and Credit
Statute2 54 requires that federal courts apply state law to determine whether a
255
state judgment bars a subsequent federal action.
When a federal court decides whether a state court tort judgment precludes a takings claim, the Full Faith and Credit Statute requires the court to
consider whether the state preclusion law would allow a takings claim to be
brought after the tort suit. A subsequent takings suit can be barred by the
state judgment on the tort suit only if the state itself would not allow a
2 56
subsequent suit.

State preclusion law should not bar the federal half of the exhaustion
model because it would conflict with the takings clause's ripeness doctrine.
The takings claim is not ripe until the state refuses to compensate the tort
victim. It is thus impossible to bring the takings claim in federal court until
after the state tort claim is resolved. Assume that state law instructed the

was whether Feldman had sought appellate review, or whether he had stated a
second cause of action on constitutional grounds. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 489-90
(Stevens, J. dissenting). Preclusion is discussed in more detail infra at notes 252-63
and accompanying text.
251

See infra note 261.

This principle of preclusion is known as collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.16 (3d ed. 1985) (outline of issue
preclusion principles).
253 See id. at §§ 11.22-11.31 (generally describing the effects of issue preclusion on
third parties).
254 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
255 Since 1984, the Supreme Court twice has firmly rejected the argument that
federal courts could give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the
state courts would. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
470 U.S. 373, 379-86 (1985); Migra, 465 U.S. at 81. Both of these decisions were
based on the Court's interpretation of the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Marrese, 470 U.S. at 379-86; Migra, 465 U.S. at 80-85.
256 Cf. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 382-83 (holding that, unless state preclusion law bars a
federal antitrust claim, there is no need to apply the federal Full Faith and Credit
statute).
252
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plaintiff to bring the takings claim together with the state tort claim. The
plaintiff, desiring a federal forum for the takings claim, might try to bring the
takings claim in federal court, and attach the state tort claim under pendent
jurisdiction. The federal court could not hear such a case, because the
takings claim would not be ripe for adjudication. The plaintiff would be
forced to bring the entire case to state court. The plaintiff's interest in a
federal forum for the federal claims would be defeated by state preclusion
rules.
When a putative federal plaintiff is forced to litigate state issues in state
court, the state interest in autonomy over its preclusion rules does not mean
that the plaintiff should be prevented from returning to federal court with the
federal issues. In an analogous situation, federal plaintiffs forced by abstention to bring their state law claims in state court, are allowed to return to
federal court with any remaining federal claims.2 57 The Court has recently
reaffirmed this entitlement to return to federal court, and acknowledged that
a litigant's right to choose a federal forum for the litigant's federal claims
may override state preclusion rules. 58 Furthermore, the Court in Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons 259 recognized a more general
power of the federal courts to make exceptions to preclusion rules where
state preclusion rules would bar a federal action that could not have been
brought together with the state action. 26 0 While allowing two separate suits

See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964)
(allowing plaintiffs to reserve federal claims for federal courts while adjudicating
state constitutional claims in state courts). England arose in the context of Pullman
abstention. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman
allocates responsibility between federal and state trial courts by requiring federal
district courts to abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues when an uncertain issue of state law might make decision of the federal issue unnecessary. Pullman
abstention directs the federal district court to stay its proceedings until the state
courts have an opportunity to decide the state law questions. The federal court is
free, after the state proceedings, to reopen the case and address the federal issues if
necessary. England and Migra hold that the subsequent federal action is allowed
regardless of state preclusion rules to the contrary. Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 n.7;
England, 375 U.S. at 421.
At least one court has held that a plaintiff may. in some circumstances, voluntarily
litigate state issues in state court and still return to federal court to litigate the federal
issues. See Wicker v. Board of Educ., 826 F.2d 442, 445-47 (6th Cir. 1987). In Wicker,
the plaintiff filed a federal claim in federal court and, before an abstention order was
entered, filed in state court on state grounds only. Id. at 444. The Sixth Circuit noted
that the federal courts are split on "whether an England reservation is valid if the
plaintiff first files in state court." Id. at 447 n.4.
258 See Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 n.7.
259 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
260 In Marrese, the issue was whether ajudgment from a state common law action
for wrongful exclusion from a professional association would bar a subsequent
257
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may not be the most economical way to run a court system, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that smooth operation of a federal system, in which
state and federal courts have the freedom to occupy their spheres free of
unnecessary interference, may warrant such additional costs in the area of
261
judgment finality.
Allowing a subsequent federal suit on the takings claim is also appropriate
in light of the reason for initially having state court jurisdiction. Federal
jurisdiction statutes can be interpreted to grant federal district court jurisdiction over the entire case-including the state tort claim-under pendent
jurisdiction. The Court need not apply its ripeness doctrine to bar the
immediate federal action, if that would bar the federal takings case completely. According to principles of federalism, it is desirable to allow the
states to formulate their own tort law policy. Giving state courts jurisdiction
over the state tort claim and federal courts jurisdiction over the takings claim
is a compromise designed to resolve problems inherent in granting either the
26 2
federal courts or the state courts jurisdiction over the entire case.

federal antitrust action. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 375-76. The issue was complicated by
the fact that the federal antitrust action could not have been brought in state court
together with the common law action, because the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over antitrust claims. Id. at 379-82.
261 See id. at 385-86. Federal court creation of a preclusion exception where
important federal interests are at stake would not be inconsistent with federalism
norms. See Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 808-31 (1986).
Burbank notes that in order to ensure adequate federal review of federal issues in
state cases, federal courts could develop federal common law preclusion rules that
allowed federal litigation of federal issues in federal court after state proceedings
concluded. The federal common law would advance the congressionally recognized
policy in favor of a federal forum, at least in civil rights cases. Id. at 831. He argues
that this would be consistent with Migra's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, because states would be required, by the supremacy
clause, to incorporate the federal common law into their preclusion rules. Once the
federal norms were incorporated into state preclusion law, the federal court would in
effect apply the same law to the preclusion problem that the state would apply, thus
satisfying the statute. Id. I am not so sure the Court would view it this way; the whole
point of Migra seems to be to avoid federal preclusion rules. I am confident that the
Court would shy away from Burbank's implication that federal courts are free to
formulate general preclusion rules and apply them in all federal question cases. But I
think Burbank correctly argues that in some narrow circumstances, exceptions to the
Migra rule are allowed.
262 This is the way the Supreme Court and Congress have solved a res judicata
problem in Title VII cases. In some situations, Congress has directed Title VII
claimants to try state administrative remedies before going to federal district court.
Defendants argued, and some circuits held, that state preclusion rules may bar the
subsequent federal Title VII action. See Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers,
Inc., 768 F.2d 842, 851-54 7th Cir. 1985) (holding that principles of administrative res
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Even if state preclusion rules barred a subsequent takings suit, there may
be good reason for federal courts to make an exception allowing a subsequent federal district court action. Despite the command of the Full Faith
and Credit Statute, the Supreme Court indicated in Marrese that in certain
circumstances the federal courts are free to ignore state preclusion rules, but
only to the extent that a federal action can be brought when state law would
2 63
preclude it.
(c) Abstention. Several judge-made abstention doctrines limit the original
jurisdiction of the district courts to keep out of federal district courts cases
involving review of state court and agency decisions. The theory behind the
abstention doctrines support the idea that in some instances it is appropriate
to divide cases between federal and state court. For present purposes,
perhaps the most important lesson from the abstention doctrines is that
federal courts often allocate responsibility between federal and state courts
to maximize the realization of competing federalism policies. Under the
exhaustion model, 64 state proceedings would be completed before the case
were brought to federal court, so abstention would not be an issue.
The most notorious form of abstention that preserves the orderly movement of cases through state courts to the United States Supreme Court is
Younger abstention. 65 In Younger v. Harris,266 the Court held that a state
criminal defendant may not bring an injunctive action in federal district court
on any federal issue that could be raised as a defense in the state criminal
trial. This decision has forced state criminal defendants to litigate their
federal defenses, at least in the first instance, in the state courts with possible
direct review by the Supreme Court.
Younger abstention supports the idea that states should receive appropriate respect and deference by giving state courts a chance to decide an issue
without eliminating the possibility of subsequent review by a federal trial

judicata barred federal Title VII action), vacated and remanded 106 S.Ct. 3328
(1986), aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 820 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that state agency's decision did not preclude plaintiff from bringing Title VII
action to federal court, but did preclude plaintiff's § 1983 action from reaching federal
court). The Supreme Court has held that Title VII entitled plaintiffs to a trial de novo
in federal court regardless of state preclusion rules. See University of Tennessee v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). State interests are vindicated by the opportunity to
address discrimination in state agencies and federal interests are vindicated by the
subsequent district court suit.
263 "The issue whether there is an exception to § 1738 arises only if state law
indicates that litigation of a particular claim or issue should be barred in the subsequent federal proceeding." Marrese, 470 U.S. at 383.
264 See supra notes 213-24 and accompanying text.
265 "Younger abstention" refers to the doctrine arising out of Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
266 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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court.167 In criminal cases, review of most federal issues in federal district
court is still available through habeas corpus. 268 Thus even though Younger
restricts federal trial court jurisdiction, and does so in the name of federalstate relations, the restriction is within the context of available subsequent
federal review akin to the type of review appropriate for takings claims.
Later expansions of the Younger doctrine have been unfriendly to the idea
that a federal hearing ought ultimately to be available. The Supreme Court
has applied Younger abstention to civil cases in which the only federal
review available would be in the Supreme Court.269 In such cases, federal
What ["Our Federalism"] does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,
and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44. Within five years after Younger was handed down, Younger abstention had
transformed from an equity-based scheme of deference to one based almost entirely
on notions of comity. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman,
the appellants, Ohio state officials, instituted a public nuisance proceeding in state
court to enjoin the appellee from showing obscene films. The trial court found for
appellants. The appellee, instead of appealing in the state system, filed suit immediately in federal court under § 1983, claiming that the Ohio nuisance statute had been
unconstitutionally applied, thereby denying him his first amendment rights. The
federal district court found the Ohio statute unconstitutional and enjoined execution
of the state's judgment insofar as it closed the theater to films that had not been
adjudged obscene in prior adversarial hearings. Id. at 595-99.
The Supreme Court overturned the district court decision. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held that Younger principles applied in civil cases which
were akin to criminal prosecutions, unless state proceedings are conducted with an
intent to harass, or are conducted in bad faith, or the challenged statute is flagrantly
and patently unconstitutional. Id. at 605-07, 611-13. The Court in Huffman recast the
relationship between § 1983 and comity by holding that it had "consistently required
that when federal courts are confronted with [requests to enjoin state proceedings],
they should abide by standards of restraint that go well beyond those of private
equity jurisprudence." Id. at 603. For a more detailed account of Younger abstention's transformation from an equity-based to a comity-based scheme, see Soifer,
The Younger Doctrine, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977).
261 Some federal issues may not be reviewed in habeas. For example, in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-82 (1976), the Court held that claims arising out of the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule may not be reviewed in federal habeas corpus.
269 See, e.g., Pennzoil, Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (tortious
inducement to breach contract); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (1986) (sex discrimination suit); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977) (contempt proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (claim under
public nuisance statute). These sorts of decisions led Professor Currie to observe that
"'Younger was not based upon the availability of habeas corpus." D. CURRIE,
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 722 (3d ed. 1982). But see Deakins v.
Monaghan, 108 S.Ct. 523, 529 (1988) (federal court must remain open to claim that
"cannot be redressed in the state proceeding" despite Younger abstention).
267
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district court jurisdiction may be unavailable if state preclusion rules bar
relitigation of the federal issues. 70 In applying abstention to foreclose the
possibility of a federal trial forum, however, the Supreme Court does not
sufficiently recognize the value of allowing litigants to bring federal issues to
federal court. The Supreme Court is operating under the misconception that
the choice of forum is less important than the policies advanced by Younger
271
abstention .
The Pullman abstention regime 272 also supports the propriety of federal
review after a state case. The Pullman regime addresses the takings problem
better than Younger abstention because Pullman involves civil actions
where plaintiffs, if allowed, would probably bring their entire cases initially
to the federal court and where some federal jurisprudential doctrine (here
ripeness) forces them to bring the state issues in the case to state court. The
England doctrine, reaffirmed in Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., recognizes the plaintiff's entitlement to return to federal court to
273
litigate the federal issues.
There is a strong federal interest in resolution of federal questions by
federal district courts. 74 This interest often conflicts with concerns federal
courts have that their proceedings may disrupt the course of state proceedings. 2 7 1 One solution that has been implemented-by court decision or
legislation-allows state proceedings to run their course and provides federal district court review of the state action. In the takings situation, this

See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
383 (1985) (holding that, unless state preclusion law bars a federal claim, plaintiff can
bring federal claim into federal court).
271 See Neuborne, supra note 221, at 1115-30. Professor Neuborne argues that the
Court's belief in federal deference to state judicial forums is based on the misconception that as a greater number of constitutional cases shift to state court, the capacity
of individuals to mount successful challenges to collective decisions will diminish.
See also Yackle, supra note 216, at 1022-24 (providing overview of arguments
comparing relative strengths and weaknesses of federal and state judges).
I72
See supra note 257.
273 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964) (Supreme Court review is "an inadequate substitute for the initial District
Court-determination ...to which the litigant is entitled in the federal courts."); see
also Wicker v. Board of Educ., 826 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing whether party
that files in both state and federal courts is entitled to bring federal issues to federal
court under the England reservation).
274 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1961) (tracing the history of
§ 1983, and explaining it as a statute designed to create a federal forum for the
vindication of federal rights that state courts failed to enforce).
275 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (stating that equity and
comity concerns underlie the policy against federal court interference with state
court procedures).
270
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would allow the state to manage its own tort policy and still provide effective
federal enforcement of takings norms.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Conflicting visions of the appropriate amount of deference federal courts
should pay to state policy pervade federal constitutional doctrine. The
Supreme Court has addressed the problem of federal supervision of state
tortious conduct without much sensitivity to the competing interests at
stake. The Court has used the spectre of federal displacement of state tort
policy to restrict federal court supervision of state law without realistically
assessing whether this supervision could be accomplished without displacing
state authority. The Supreme Court has been unable, or at least unwilling, to
create a system that recognizes and accommodates the federal interest in
allowing litigants to choose a federal forum for federal claims.
One purpose of this article has been to persuade the reader that the
treatment of victims of state-inflicted torts is legitimately a matter for federal
concern. State and local governments are in a position to inflict great injury
to private parties. Often, states claim authority to refuse to compensate for
the injuries they cause or at least to compensate only on their own terms and
not fully. The federal courts need not and should not defer to state decisions
based on sovereign and official immunity. Immunities for states and state
officials are contrary to the spirit of democratic government and the rule of
law. Federalism demands respect for state institutions not deference to state
transgressions.

